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Abstract
The anti-retaliation provision of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 protects
employees who report perceived workplace discrimination or who otherwise participate
in the investigative or enforcement process of alleged Title VII discrimination. The
statute provides little guidance, however, as to the scope of this protection. Thus,
disagreement abounded among the lower federal courts, not only as to whether the antiretaliation provision prohibited employer acts outside the workplace as well as within,
but also as to the level of severity to which an alleged retaliatory act must rise in order to
support a claim. The Supreme Court sought to resolve this disagreement in June 2006
when it decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, but its decision
fails to supply a clear, judicially administrable standard by which employers can readily
abide. Instead, by focusing its inquiry into the statute’s language and underlying
purposes too narrowly, the Court’s decision is plagued by a vague standard with a highly
subjective component that insulates employees who engage in protected activity from
even the slightest workplace changes. This vague and subjective standard not only lacks
sufficient support in the statute but also directly contravenes Title VII’s policies of
workplace equality, employer forethought, and management prerogative. Moreover,
courts will likely struggle to administer this standard with any substantial degree of
consistency, and well-meaning employers will find compliance extremely difficult as a
result. This Article therefore proposes that Congress intervene to correct the problems
that the Court’s decision in White creates. Specifically, this Article suggests that
Congress amend the anti-retaliation provision so that its language more closely mirrors
that found in the statute’s core substantive provision, and the better-developed standards
thereunder may control discrimination and retaliation claims alike.
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I.

INTRODUCTION.

When the United States Supreme Court decided Burlington Northern & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. White2 on June 22, 2006, it created an uber-protected class of those
workers who have complained of discrimination or participated in some way in the
resolution or investigation process of their own or someone else’s charge of
discrimination. The Court’s eagerly anticipated3 decision in White ties the hands of
employers without sufficient need and, more importantly, without sufficient basis in the
relevant statute or its underlying policy goals.4 While protection for whistleblowers is of
utmost importance in today’s workplace,5 the Court went too far in White, implementing
a vague and highly subjective standard that affords employees who complain of
discrimination, whether founded or not, what in practicality amounts to near immunity
from even the slightest changes in working conditions. Indeed, after the Court’s decision
in White, an employer must treat an employee who has engaged in any activity protected
by Title VII with kid gloves and must be far more careful about its interaction with any
such employee than it must be as to those workers in the minority groups Title VII was
originally enacted to protect.
This Article will explain how the Court’s decision in White goes too far in
protecting employees who complain of discrimination under Title VII, both as a matter of
statutory interpretation and as a matter of policy. In Part II, I will frame the issue by
comparing and contrasting the two most relevant statutory provisions and highlighting
the decisions of the United States Supreme Court that bear on their interpretation. In Part
III, I will expose the issue as it arose in a split among the federal circuit courts of appeals
and as it came to the Supreme Court in White, and in Part IV I will discuss the Supreme
Court’s decision in the White case itself. In Part V, I will explain the practical and legal
ramifications of the White decision, and, finally, I propose in Part VI that Congress
intervene to fix the problems the decision creates.
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126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006).
See, e.g., Ross’s Employment Law Blog, “ ‘Adverse Employment Action’ Argument in Supreme
Court,” http://www.lawmemo.com/blog/2006/04/adverse_employm_1.html (visited July 5, 2006) (referring
to White case as “the most important employment law case of the year”); Whitman, Robert, “Supreme
Court Clarifies Standards for Title VII Claims,” Mondaq Bus. Briefing (Jun. 27, 2006) (referring to
Supreme Court’s decision in White as “eagerly anticipated”).
4
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
5
See generally Richard Lacayo & Amanda Ripley, Persons of the Year, TIME, Dec. 30, 2002, at
___ (naming as persons of the year corporate whistleblowers Sherron Watkins of Enron, Coleen Rowley of
the FBI and Cynthia Cooper of Worldcom).
3
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II.

THE SOURCE OF THE CONFLICT: TWO SIMILAR BUT DISTINCT
STATUTORY PROVISIONS, AND THE SUPREME COURT’S LIMITED
INTERPRETIVE INPUT.
A.

An Exercise in Comparison and Contrast: The Relevant Statutory
Provisions.

When Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 forty-two years
ago, it sought to combat one of the biggest social problems of that era – rampant
discrimination against minorities in the workplace.6 In order to effectuate this purpose,
Congress made it “an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or refuse
to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”7 This core
substantive statutory provision was intended to prohibit employers from treating
employees differently from one another because of such employees’ protected trait or
traits.8 Title VII does not, however, tout as its primary goal redress of the harms that
might be brought about by these banned discriminatory acts.9 Instead, the statute is
intended to be preventive in nature, and encourages employer forethought, employee
involvement in deterrence and enforcement, and conciliation before litigation.10 To that
end, the statute not only makes it unlawful to treat employees differently because of their
race, sex, religion, and national origin, but also prohibits “discriminat[ion] against” any
employee who has “opposed” any employment practice made unlawful by Title VII or
has “made a charge, testified, or participated in any manner in an investigation,
proceeding, or hearing” under Title VII.11 This section of the statute, often referred to as
the “anti-retaliation provision,” thus creates an additional protected class – i.e., an
employee is protected by Title VII not only on the basis of her “race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin,” but also on the basis of her status as an employee who either has
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See generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 800 (1973) (“The language of
Title VII makes plain the purpose of Congress to assure equality of employment opportunities and to
eliminate those discriminatory practices and devices which have fostered racially stratified job
environments to the disadvantage of minority citizens.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30
(1971) (“The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It
was to achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to
favor an identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”); H.R. Rep. No. 914, reprinted in
1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2391 (“This bill, as amended, is designed primarily to protect and provide more
effective means to enforce the civil rights of persons within the jurisdiction of the United States.”).
7
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
8
Id.; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 792; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 429-30.
9
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (“Although Title VII seeks to
make persons whole for injuries suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination, … its
primary objective, like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is not to provide redress but
to avoid harm.”) (citations omitted).
10
Id.; see also Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (referencing “Congress’s
intention to promote conciliation rather than litigation in the Title VII context”) (citing EEOC v. Shell Oil
Co., 466 U.S. 54, 77 (1984)).
11
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
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complained of the sort of discrimination prohibited by the statute or has participated in
the investigation or trial of such a claim.12
Congress enacted the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII at the same time it
enacted the core substantive provision of the statute,13 and used similar language in both
provisions. Specifically, both Section 703 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(what I refer to as the “core substantive provision” of the statute, which is codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2) and Section 704 (the anti-retaliation provision, codified at 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-3) use the terms “discriminate against” to describe the sort of action made
unlawful thereby. The term “discriminate against,” however, though employed
repeatedly, is never expressly defined in the statute. Moreover, although the Supreme
Court has on several occasions spoken to the scope and meaning of the core substantive
provision more generally,14 it has not (at least until this last term15) addressed specifically
the scope and meaning of the terms “discriminate against” as they appear anywhere in the
statute.16
Even absent a statutory definition or explicit Supreme-Court-endorsed
interpretation, the lower courts and commentators agreed almost unanimously that both
the core substantive provision and its anti-retaliation counterpart require plaintiff to prove
some adverse action to make out a prima facie case. That is, the circuit courts have
generally agreed that the term “discriminate against” as used in both provisions requires a
plaintiff to prove some adverse employment action by the employer.17 This substantial
12

Id. §§ 2000e-2(a) & 2000e-3(a); see also Sanders v. New York City Human Res. Admin., 361
F.3d 749, 754 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Title VII makes an employer liable for discriminating against its employees
based on race or gender, or for retaliating against an employee for having challenged such
discrimination.”).
13
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 257 (July 2, 1964).
14
See infra notes __ - __ and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court cases interpreting Title
VII’s core substantive provision).
15
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-16 (2006).
16
Nor does the legislative history offer clear answers. The Congressional Record includes only a
basic definition of the term “discriminate,” contained in an interpretive memorandum read into the record
during a Title VII debate: “To discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in treatment or
favor . . . .” 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964).
17
See, e.g., Sanders, 361 F.3d at 754 (stating that aggrieved employee must show “adverse
employment action” to support claim under either core substantive anti-discrimination provision or antiretaliation provision of Title VII); Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d 778, 787 (3rd Cir.
1998) (Alito, J.) (stating that “our Court and others have interpreted ‘discriminat[ion] to mean conduct that
falls within the basic prohibition against employment discrimination found in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1),”
and that courts thus require plaintiff to “show that he suffered a ‘materially adverse employment action’ ”
to support claim under either core substantive provision or anti-retaliation provision); James v. Booz-Allen
& Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 n.2 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting that court’s own prior interpretation of Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision, requiring “some adverse employment action” to state cognizable claim,
applied with equal force in case where plaintiff claims discrimination under statute’s core substantive
provision); Hernandez v. Crawford Bldg. Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531-32 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing 5th
Circuit precedent for proposition that anti-discrimination provision and anti-retaliation provision of Title
VII both require showing of adverse employment action, albeit of different degrees); White v. Burlington
N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), reh’g en banc denied Apr. 26,
2005, aff’d sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2405 (2006) (holding that term “discriminate against” in anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII should be interpreted to require same materially adverse employment action required
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unanimity did not, however, translate into universal agreement. Thus, while the courts
agreed that an employee must show some adverse action by the employer to state a prima
facie case of retaliation, a heated debate arose as to what actions by employers should
suffice to satisfy the adverse-action element. The disagreement focused on the statutory
language, with primary emphasis on the similarities and differences between the core
substantive provision of Title VII and its anti-retaliation counterpart. Specifically, the
language of the anti-retaliation provision simply declares it “an unlawful employment
practice for an employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment” because any such employee has engaged in protected activity.18 Similarly,
the core substantive provision also labels the prohibited conduct “an unlawful
employment practice” and uses the term “discriminate against” to describe the acts made
unlawful thereby, but then goes on to include more detail – that is, Section 703 makes it
“an unlawful employment practice for an employer … to fail or refuse to hire or to
discharge any individual or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s [protected trait.]”19 As such, the core substantive provision describes in
more detail the kind of discrimination it prohibits, including not only refusal to hire and
discharge but also other forms of discrimination that affect the employee’s
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”20 By contrast, the antiretaliation provision includes no reference to forms of “discriminat[ion]” and instead only
makes it “an unlawful employment practice . . . to discriminate.” 21 Courts disagreed
about how to interpret these two related but distinct statutory provisions, and the
legislative history offered no guidance.22 Should courts treat the anti-retaliation
to support claim under core substantive anti-discrimination provision of not only Title VII but also other
federal employment discrimination statutes like Americans With Disabilities Act); Griffin v. Potter, 356
F.3d 824, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying same “materially adverse” employment action standard to both
Title VII retaliation claim and discrimination claim under Age Discrimination in Employment Act);
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997) (“In order to overcome her initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation, appellant was required to show, among
other things, that she suffered an adverse employment action that affected the terms or conditions of her
employment.”); Heno v. Sprint/United Mgm’t Co., 208 F.3d 847, 857 (10th Cir. 2000) (stating that alleged
adverse action is sufficient to support retaliation claim under Title VII only if materially affects
“compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” as under core substantive provision of
Title VII); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (requiring “ ‘materially adverse
consequences affecting the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ ” to support retaliation claim
and quoting standard from case pertaining to claim under anti-discrimination provision).
18
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).
19
Id. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (emphasis added).
20
Id.
21
Id. § 2000e-3(a).
22
The legislative history of Title VII contains almost no reference to the anti-retaliation provision.
What reference it does contain amounts to nothing more than a committee report’s reiteration of part of the
anti-retaliation provision without any explanation of its meaning. H.R. Rep No. 914, reprinted in 1964
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2391, 2403; see Edward C. Walterscheid, A Question of Retaliation: Opposition Conduct as
Protected Expression Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29 B.C. L. REV. 391, 393 (1988).
Courts have therefore been left to interpret the anti-retaliation provision without the aid of any legislative
history. Hochstadt v. Worcester Found. For Experimental Biology, 545 F.2d 222, 230 (1st Cir. 1976). The
court in Hochstadt described the predicament well:
Neither in its wording nor legislative history does section 704(a) make plain how far
Congress meant to immunize hostile and disruptive employee activity when it declared it
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provision’s unadorned prohibition of “discriminat[ion] against” protected individuals as
shorthand for the more detailed acts prohibited in the statute’s core substantive provision?
Or does Congress’s omission of the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” language from the anti-retaliation provision signal a difference, intentional
or not, in the scope of the prohibited conduct? If so, does that difference make the antiretaliation provision broader, such that it encompasses more employer acts as prohibited
discrimination than its sister provision, or does the difference make the anti-retaliation
provision narrower, encompassing only the most severe employment decisions?
B.

Helpful Instruction or Added Confusion?: The Supreme Court Precedents
Pertinent to the Debate.

The Supreme Court has decided numerous cases under Title VII since its
enactment over 40 years ago, but has offered very little express instruction as to the
meaning of the term “discriminate against” as used therein. Indeed, it was not until late
last term that the Supreme Court addressed the meaning of the adverse-action element in
the retaliation context at all.23 Prior to that time, the Court had, however, spoken at least
indirectly to the adversity requirement in the discrimination context.
Most of the Court’s precedents instructive on the adversity requirement involve
claims of sexual harassment. Perhaps the clearest such instruction came in the Court’s
1986 decision in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson.24 The plaintiff in that case, Mechelle
Vinson, claimed sexual harassment by her supervisor, who managed the branch of
defendant Meritor Savings Bank where she worked.25 The Bank claimed that Vinson
could not prevail under Title VII because the hostile-environment harassment she alleged
resulted in no tangible or economic loss.26 The Court rejected the Bank’s argument,
holding that “[t]he language of Title VII is not limited to ‘economic’ or ‘tangible’
discrimination.”27 Notably, though, the Court did not base its decision on the term
“discriminate against” but instead focused on the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment,” finding that it “evinces a congressional intent ‘to strike at the entire
spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in employment” and therefore is not
limited solely to “economic” or “tangible” harm.28 Thus, the Court held that a plaintiff
unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an employee "because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter . . . ." 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). The statute says no more, and the committee reports on the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1963, which later became
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, repeat the language of 704(a) without any explanation.
See H.Rep.No.914, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News, p. 2401
(1964); H.Rep.No.570, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1963). The proceedings and floor debates
over Title VII are similarly unrevealing. Courts are thus left to develop their own
interpretation of protected opposition.
Id. at 230.
23
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2414-16 (2006).
24
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
25
Id. at 59-60.
26
Id. at 64.
27
Id.
28
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986).
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could prevail on a claim of sexual harassment under Title VII even without proof of any
resultant tangible or economic injury: “For sexual harassment to be actionable, it must be
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and
create an abusive working environment.”29
The Court’s reliance on the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” rather than the phrase “discriminate against” in Meritor Savings Bank is
not necessarily intuitive. Indeed, before the Court decided that case, one might have
readily argued that the term “discriminate against,” used to describe the conduct made
unlawful under Title VII, indicates the type and severity of harm required to support a
claim, while the phrase “terms, conditions, and privileges of employment” simply signals
that the alleged “discriminat[ion]” must somehow affect the employment relationship.30
Under this view, a decision that the core substantive provision prohibits not just
economic or tangible harm but also non-economic, intangible forms of discrimination so
long as they are severe or pervasive, might have made the most sense as an interpretation
of the term “discriminate against.” That is not, however, the position the Court took.
Instead, the Court relied upon Congress’s use of the phrase “terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment” to support its conclusion that Title VII encompasses such
intangible harms. Thus, the Court’s decision in Meritor Savings Bank at least supports, if
it does not stand for, the proposition that the phrase “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment” as used in Title VII limits the scope of the statute to those discriminatory
actions which have either a direct (i.e., tangible or economic) effect on the plaintiff’s
employment or an indirect (i.e., intangible, non-economic) effect but are nevertheless
severe and pervasive.
The Supreme Court has espoused this view on several occasions since deciding
Meritor Savings Bank.31 Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.32 is illustrative. Teresa Harris,
like Mechelle Vinson, claimed sexual harassment by her supervisor – in this case the
company’s president.33 The district court held that while some of the acts of harassment
alleged by Harris “ ‘offended [Harris] and would offend the reasonable woman,’ … they
were not ‘so severe as to be expected to seriously affect [Harris’] psychological well-

29

Id. at 67.
See Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination, 47 EMORY L. J. 1121, 1151-53 (1998)
(proposing that phrase “ ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ emphasizes the
employment-related nature of the prohibited discrimination . . . [and] is better read as making clear that an
employer who discriminates against an employee in a non-job-related context would not run afoul of Title
VII, rather than as sheltering employment discrimination that does not significantly disadvantage an
employee”).
31
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787 (1998) (“We have repeatedly made clear
that although the statute mentions specific employment decisions with immediate consequences, the scope
of the prohibition ‘is not limited to economic or tangible discrimination’ . . . and that it covers more than
‘terms and conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense. . . . Thus, in Meritor we held that sexual harassment
so ‘severe or pervasive’ as to ‘alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive
working environment’ violates Title VII.”); Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78
(1998) (reiterating Meritor Savings Bank holding).
32
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
33
Id. at 19.
30
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being’ ” and accordingly were not actionable.34 The court of appeals affirmed, but the
Supreme Court reversed, holding that a plaintiff alleging hostile-environment harassment
need not demonstrate that the alleged conduct “seriously affected her psychological wellbeing.”35 Instead, she need only show that her work environment would reasonably be
perceived, and was subjectively perceived by her, as hostile or abusive, in order to
support her claim.36 In so holding, the Court expressly reaffirmed its decision in Meritor
Savings Bank, defining a “hostile” or “abusive” work environment as one that “is
permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult’ . . . that is ‘sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim's employment and create an
abusive working environment.’ ”37 Thus, the Court’s decisions in Meritor Savings Bank
and Harris, read together, demonstrate that the Court interprets Title VII’s core
substantive provision to provide relief not only when an employer inflicts direct
economic or tangible harm to the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, but also when the employer’s conduct brings about only
intangible, non-economic harm that otherwise constitutes sufficiently severe or pervasive
discrimination as to alter the terms and conditions of the employee’s work environment,
making it hostile or abusive.
The Court’s 1998 decision in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth38 focused on
agency law as a determinant of an employer’s vicarious liability for sexual harassment,
but also addressed at least indirectly the severity of harm required under the statute,
leaving courts and commentators wondering about its import in other contexts. Kimberly
Ellerth claimed that her supervisor, a midlevel manager at defendant-employer
Burlington Industries, had subjected her to constant sexual harassment.39 While much of
the alleged harassment consisted of threats to affect adversely the terms of Ellerth’s
employment, none of these threats were ever carried out.40 Thus, the issue before the
Court in that case was “whether, under Title VII . . ., an employee who refuses the
unwelcome and threatening sexual advances of a supervisor, yet suffers no adverse,
tangible job consequences, can recover against the employer without showing the
employer is negligent or otherwise at fault for the supervisor’s action.”41 In analyzing
this question, the Court first reaffirmed the holding in Meritor Savings Bank as it is
described above, instructing “that Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive
alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and . . . the latter must be severe or
pervasive.”42 Turning then to the agency aspects of the question presented, the Court
held that an employer is strictly liable for supervisory harassment that constitutes a
“tangible employment action” but may only be held responsible for supervisor
34

Id. at 20.
Id. at 22.
36
Id.
37
Id. at 21.
38
524 U.S 742 (1998).
39
Id. at 747-48.
40
Id. at 751.
41
Id. at 747.
42
Id. at 752; see also id. at 754 (stating that claim of hostile-work-environment harassment, i.e. one
involving only unfulfilled threats as opposed to threats carried out, “requires a showing of severe or
pervasive conduct”).
35
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misconduct short of that standard if the employer was negligent.43 Most significant here
is the Court’s “import[ation]” of the “tangible employment action” concept from circuit
court cases defining the adverse-action element of a Title VII discrimination claim to
mark the dividing line between conduct for which employers are strictly liable and
conduct for which an affirmative defense may be available. The Court stated: “A
tangible employment action constitutes a significant change in employment status, such
as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different
responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.”44 Thus, under
Ellerth, an employer whose supervisory employee engages in harassment that falls short
of a tangible employment action may avoid liability upon showing that it had in place
adequate anti-harassment policies and complaint procedures that the employee
unreasonably failed to invoke, but the employer whose supervisor’s harassment
culminates in a tangible employment action is liable for that misconduct without regard
to any care it may have taken to avoid such harms.45 Notably, though, while the Court
expressly relied upon the circuit courts’ definition of adverse action for claims under the
core substantive provision, it did not adopt or even endorse that definition for the purpose
it served in those cases.46 As such, the significance of the Court’s “import[ation]” of that
definition was left open for debate among the lower courts and commentators.47 It was
not until its decision in White that the Court offered its own view of that matter.48
The Court’s decision during that same term in Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services, Inc.49 was among the few to address more directly the meaning of the term
“discriminate” under Title VII. The male plaintiff in Oncale alleged sexual harassment
43

Id. at 765.
Id. at 761
45
Id. at 765.
46
Id. at 761.
47
Courts and commentators alike eagerly engaged in this debate. See, e.g., Boone v. Goldin, 178
F.3d 253, 256 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Ellerth as controlling standard of liability for retaliation claims); Scott
Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under
Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53
DRAKE L. REV. 359, 414-16 (2005) (suggesting that courts nationwide adopt adverse action standard
modeled after Supreme Court’s definition of “tangible employment action” in Ellerth); Rosalie Berger
Levinson, Parsing the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual
Harassment, and Retaliation Claims: What Should be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623,
624 (2003) (criticizing lower courts for “indiscriminately borrow[ing] from” Ellerth to define adverse
employment action); Joan M. Savage, Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse
Employment Action Prong in a Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B. C. L. REV. 215, 246-47
(2004) (proposing that EEOC’s deterrence-based adverse action standard is “most logical” in light of
Supreme Court’s decision in Ellerth); White, supra note 30, at 1157 (“Read in full, the distinction drawn in
[Ellerth] is not between adverse action by a supervisor that is sufficiently material and that which is not, but
between employment decisions that can be made only by supervisors and workplace harassment that can be
engaged in by supervisors and co-workers alike.”).
48
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 126 S. Ct. 2405, 2413 (2006) (limiting Ellerth’s
discussion of “tangible employment actions” to providing dividing line between hostile-environment
harassment cases in which employer is liable for supervisor acts with and without affirmative defense and
stating unequivocally that “Ellerth did not discuss the scope of the general anti-discrimination provision …
[a]nd … did not mention Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision at all”); see infra notes __ - __ and
accompanying text (discussing Court’s dismissal of Ellerth as authoritative precedent in deciding White).
49
523 U.S. 75 (1998).
44
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by his male supervisors and co-workers.50 The district and circuit courts agreed that Title
VII did not support a cause of action for same-sex sexual harassment, but the Supreme
Court reversed.51 As in Ellerth, the Court here likewise turned first to Meritor Savings
Bank and Harris as precedents defining the contours of actionable misconduct under Title
VII.52 The focus there, as before, was on Congress’s use of the words “terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment” in the statute’s core substantive provision, and the Court
recognized again that those words do not limit the scope of the statute to those employer
acts that affect “ ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’ in the narrow contractual sense, but [that they
instead] ‘evince[] a congressional intent to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women in employment.’ ”53 The Court did not, however, limit its
focus to that particular statutory language when it went about justifying its holding that
Title VII reaches claims of same-sex harassment. This time, the Court also relied on
Congress’s use of the term “discriminate” to define the prohibited conduct: “Title VII
does not prohibit all verbal or physical harassment in the workplace; it is directed only at
‘discriminat[ion] … because of … sex.’ . . . The critical issue, Title VII’s text indicates,
is whether members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or conditions of
employment to which members of the other sex are not exposed.”54 Plaintiff “must
always prove that the conduct at issue was not merely tinged with offensive sexual
connotations, but actually constituted ‘discriminat[ion] … because of … sex.’ ”55 These
assertions do not answer all the questions, but they offer at least two hints as to what the
Court thinks Congress meant by the term “discriminate” in Title VII: (1) such
“discriminat[ion]” may occur when an employer subjects certain protected-class
individuals to terms and conditions of employment that are “disadvantageous” compared
to treatment afforded to others; and (2) employer conduct that is “merely tinged with
offensive … connotations” related to the employee’s protected trait does not constitute
actionable “discriminat[ion].”
The Court had also referenced briefly the meaning of the term “discriminate”
under Title VII nearly ten years earlier in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, though without
substantial clarification.56 There, the court quoted an interpretive memorandum entered
into the Congressional Record at the time of Title VII’s enactment.57 The memorandum
defined the term “discriminate” generally: “To discriminate is to make a distinction, to
make a difference in treatment or favor . . . .”58
Until it decided White, the Court never came any closer to defining the term
“discriminate against” as used in Title VII other than these less-than-lucid assertions in
Price Waterhouse and Oncale. Moreover, the instruction the Court did provide pertained
specifically to the core substantive provision, not the anti-retaliation provision, further
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58

Id. at 77.
Id. at 77, 82.
Id. at 78.
Id.
Id. at 80 (emphasis and alteration in original).
Id.
490 U.S. 228 (1989).
Id. at 243-44.
Id. (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. 7213 (1964)).
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fostering uncertainty as to the latter provision’s meaning and scope. Thus, the lower
courts were left to interpret on their own what Congress intended. Their tools were
limited to the statutory language itself, the sparse Supreme Court authorities on point, and
their assessments of legislative policy based on these sources.
III.

THE CONFLICT DEVELOPS: A THREE-WAY (OR MORE) CIRCUIT SPLIT

Questions about the scope of the anti-retaliation provision, in the absence of any
instruction from the Supreme Court, led the lower courts into great dissension and
developed into a three-way split among the federal circuit courts of appeals. At one end
of the spectrum, the Fifth and Eighth Circuits interpreted the anti-retaliation provision as
narrower than the statute’s core substantive provision, and required plaintiff to show an
“ultimate employment action,” such as “ ‘hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting,
and compensating.’ ”59 At the other end of the spectrum, the Ninth Circuit read the
difference in language to make the anti-retaliation provision broader, and therefore
required only that plaintiff show an action “reasonably likely to deter” protected
activity.60 Finally, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits, reading the provisions together, adopted variants on a middle-ground
“materially adverse action” standard.61 The split engendered significant debate, and
received substantial attention from commentators.62
59

Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003); see also, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2003) (“ ‘Our court has analyzed
the ‘adverse employment action’ element in a stricter sense than some other circuits.’ . . . In the Fifth
Circuit, only an ‘ultimate employment decision’ by an employer can form the basis for liability for
retaliation under Title VII.” (citing Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 705 (5th Cir. 1997)));
Okruhlik v. University of Arkansas, 395 F.3d 872 (8th Cir. 2005) (affirming judgment as matter of law for
employer on grounds no adverse employment action shown because denial of tenure was not final decision
and so not an “ultimate act” of employer).
60
E.g. Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1237 (9th Cir. 2000) (“[A]an adverse employment action is
adverse treatment that is reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.”)
61
See, e.g., Noviello v. City of Boston, 398 F.3d 76, 92-93 (1st Cir. 2005) (indicating that term
“discriminate” should carry same meaning in anti-retaliation provision as in anti-discrimination provision
of Title VII and requiring some evidence of severe or pervasive harassment to support adverse-action
element of retaliation claim); Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (setting
threshold as “materially adverse employment action”); Fairbrother v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir.
2005) (“An adverse employment action is a ‘materially adverse change’ in the terms and conditions of
employment.”); Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that employee
cannot establish retaliation claim without evidence that employer’s actions altered employee’s terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 865 (4th Cir. 2001)
(“What is necessary in all § 2000e-3 retaliation cases is evidence that the challenged discriminatory acts or
harassment adversely effected ‘the terms, conditions, or benefits’ of the plaintiff’s employment.”); Ford v.
General Motors Corp., 305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2002) (“With respect to the third element of the prima
facie case, the adverse employment action must be ‘materially adverse’ for the plaintiff to succeed on a
Title VII claim.”); Moser v. Indiana Dep’t of Corrections, 406 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2005) (indicating that only
those employer actions meeting a threshold level of materiality may support retaliation claim); Griffin v.
Potter, 356 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An adverse employment action must be materially adverse, not
merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities. … An adverse employment action is one that
significantly alters the terms and conditions of the employee’s job . . . .”); Medina v. Income Support
Division, 431 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]o constitute an adverse action, the employer’s conduct
must be ‘materially adverse’ to the employee’s job status.”); Stavropoulos v. Firestone, 361 F.3d 610, 617
(11th Cir. 2004) (stating that non-ultimate employment decisions are actionable only if “meet some
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A.

The “Ultimate Employment Decision” Standard: The Fifth and Eighth
Circuits

The approach taken by the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals was
perhaps most extreme. In those Circuits, an employee could establish a prima facie case
of retaliation under Title VII only by showing that the employer made an “ultimate
employment decision” about the employee’s job.63 The standard set the bar quite high:
“An employment action that ‘does not affect job duties, compensation, or benefits’ is not
an adverse employment action under Title VII. . . Only ‘ultimate employment decisions
such as hiring, granting leave, discharging, promoting, and compensating’ satisfy the
adverse employment action element. . . . [A] decision made by an employer that only
limits an employee’s opportunities for promotion or lateral transfer does not qualify as an
adverse employment action under Title VII.”64 This exacting standard precluded
employee-plaintiffs from recovering in many cases alleging a wide range of employer
decisions as adverse, including hostile treatment by supervisors and/or co-workers,65 job
transfers or duty changes described as “purely lateral” even though involving work in a
dirtier or otherwise less desirable position or location,66 implementation of new job
threshold level of substantiality,” defined as “ ‘objectively serious and tangible enough’ to alter [the
employee’s] ‘compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ ”).
62
E.g, Brian A. Riddell & Richard A. Bales, Adverse Employment Action in Retaliation Cases, 24
U. BALT. L. REV. 313 (2005); Scott Rosenberg & Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for
Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common Law
Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 359 (2005); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Parsing
the Meaning of “Adverse Employment Action” in Title VII Disparate Treatment, Sexual Harassment, and
Retaliation Claims: What Should be Actionable Wrongdoing?, 56 OKLA. L. REV. 623 (2003); Joan M.
Savage, Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a
Prima Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B. C. L. REV. 215 (2004); Linda M. Glover, Title VII Section
704(a) Retaliation Claims: Turning a Blind Eye Toward Justice, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 577 (2001).
63
Hernandez v. Crawford Building Material Co., 321 F.3d 528, 531 (5th Cir. 2003); Hockman v.
Westward Comms., LLC, 122 Fed. Appx. 734 (5th Cir. 2004)
64
Banks v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003).
65
Hockman, 122 Fed. Appx. at 748; Henthorn v. Capitol Comms., Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1028-29 (8th
Cir. 2004).
66
Id.; see also Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary
judgment to defendant-employer on grounds plaintiff failed to show adverse employment action based on
replacement of employees she supervised with different employees in same job classification because such
change involved “only minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits”).
Notably, the Eighth Circuit was not entirely uniform in its approach, and issued several decisions that
appeared to water down the ultimate-employment-decision standard announced in Ledergerber. See, e.g.,
Henthorn v. Capitol Comms., Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1028 (8th Cir. 2004) (omitting any reference to
“ultimate” employment actions and instead purporting to require only a “material change in employment”
with a direct effect on the employee’s “ ‘salary, benefits, or responsibilities’ ”); Baker v. John Morrell &
Co., 382 F.3d 816, 829-30 (8th Cir. 2004) (upholding claim even though alleged adverse acts had no direct
impact on plaintiff’s compensation, benefits or employment status); Spears v. Missouri Dep’t of
Corrections & Human Resources, 210 F.3d 850 (8th Cir. 2000) (finding, without reference to “ultimate”
employment action, that allegations of transfer from one facility to another with no other change in pay or
benefits and of downward alteration of performance evaluation failed to support actionable retaliation claim
because involved only minor changes in working conditions and no reduction in pay or benefits and job
evaluation was not used to her detriment); Cossette v. Minnesota Power & Light, 188 F.3d 964, 972 (8th
Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment to employer on employee’s retaliation claim based on negative
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requirements that prevented plaintiffs from receiving pay increases or promotions,67 and
denial of professorial tenure when avenues of appeal remained available.68 In short, these
circuits required a final, ultimate act with a direct effect on the employee’s compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment to support a retaliation claim, and
“mediate” or “interlocutory” decisions69 with only indirect adverse effects would not
suffice.
B.

The “Reasonably-Likely-to-Deter” Standard: The Ninth Circuit and the
EEOC

At the opposing end of the spectrum from the Fifth and Eighth Circuits was the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. That court held in Ray v.
Henderson that “an action is cognizable as an adverse employment action if it is
reasonably likely to deter employees from engaging in protected activity.”70 In Ray, the
plaintiff-employee claimed retaliation based on employer decisions that affected the
terms and conditions of his employment both indirectly and directly, in varying degrees.71
The court concluded that all of the employer actions alleged by plaintiff qualified as
sufficiently adverse to support a claim of retaliation: “[t]he actions decreased [plaintiff’s]
pay, decreased the amount of time that he had to complete the same amount of work, and
performance evaluation because “[a]t most, the evaluation resulted in a loss of status or prestige without
any material change in [plaintiff’s] salary, position, or duties”). The court did not, however, explicitly
overrule its ultimate-employment decision precedent, and in 2005 again appeared to demand the higher
level of adversity sanctioned under the ultimate-employment-decision standard. Okruhlik v. University of
Ark., 395 F.3d 872, 879-881 (8th Cir. 2005) (finding insufficient to support retaliation claim tenure-track
professor’s allegations that she was denied tenure because avenues of appeal were still available to her and
“each decision along the way is not actionable”; “[o]nly the final decision is the ultimate act”). Moreover,
most courts and commentators agree that the Eighth Circuit applied the same “ultimate-employmentdecision” standard as the Fifth, even though the court was not always so explicit. See, e.g. White v.
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 799-800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), reh’g en banc denied
Apr. 26, 2005, aff’d sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2415 (2006) (stating that Fifth and Eighth Circuits applied
“ultimate employment decision” standard); Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240-41 (9th Cir. 2000)
(“The most restrictive view of adverse employment actions is held by the Fifth and Eighth Circuits.”);
Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th Cir. 1998) (noting that “the Eighth Circuit
has sided with the Fifth Circuit” in requiring “ultimate employment decision” to support retaliation claim);
Brian A. Riddell & Richard A. Bales, Adverse Employment Action in Retaliation Cases, 24 U. BALT. L.
REV. 313, 316-17 (2005) (“The Fifth and Eighth Circuits take the restrictive approach, holding that only
ultimate employment decisions . . . constitute actionable adverse employment actions.”); Joan M. Savage,
Note, Adopting the EEOC Deterrence Approach to the Adverse Employment Action Prong in a Prima
Facie Case for Title VII Retaliation, 46 B. C. L. REV. 215, 216 (2004) (noting that Fifth and Eighth Circuits
both follow ultimate-employment-decision standard). But see White, 364 F.3d at 801 (“[W]hile the Eighth
Circuit has ostensibly adopted the ‘ultimate employment decision’ standard, it has consistently applied a
broader standard.”); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 864 (4th Cir. 2001) (same); Scott Rosenberg
& Jeffrey Lipman, Developing a Consistent Standard for Evaluating a Retaliation Case Under Federal and
State Civil Rights Statutes and State Common Law Claims: An Iowa Model for the Nation, 53 DRAKE L.
REV. 359, 381-84 (2005) (describing Eighth Circuit’s test as requiring only material adversity, not ultimate
employment action).
67
Banks, 320 F.3d at 576-77.
68
Okruhlik, 395 F.3d at 972.
69
Banks, 320 F.3d at 578; Okruhlik, 395 F.3d at 879.
70
217 F.3d at 1243.
71
Id. at 1237-39.
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decreased his ability to influence workplace policy, and thus were reasonably likely to
deter [plaintiff] or other employees from complaining about discrimination in the
workplace.”72 While an employer action that decreases the employee’s compensation
would often qualify as well under the stricter “ultimate employment decision” standard,
most of the other actions alleged by the plaintiff in Ray would likely have been dismissed
by a court in the Fifth or Eighth Circuit as insufficient to support a retaliation claim. In
this respect, then, the Ninth Circuit’s “reasonably likely to deter” standard was
substantially broader than that followed in its sister circuits, who required an “ultimate”
act to support a claim.
The EEOC also endorsed the “reasonably-likely-to-deter” standard as adopted by
the Ninth Circuit. The most recent version of the EEOC Compliance Manual addressed
to retaliation, published in 1998, states that “[t]he statutory retaliation clauses prohibit
any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to
deter the charging party or others from engaging in protected activity.”73 In support of
its position, the EEOC cites to both the “statutory language” and “policy
considerations.”74 As to the former, the EEOC states that the language of the antiretaliation provision is broader than the core substantive provision of the statute because
it does not purport to limit its coverage to those employer acts that affect the “terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.”75 As to the latter, the EEOC contends that its
interpretation “accords with the primary purpose of the anti-retaliation provision, which
is to ‘[m]aintain[] unfettered access to the statutory remedial mechanisms,’ ”76 by
providing broad protection for employees who would or do complain about
discrimination so that the public interest in enforcing the statute is promoted.77
The EEOC has not always endorsed this broad approach, though. Indeed, it was
not until 1998, when the EEOC introduced its latest interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII, that it advocated this “reasonably-likely-to-deter” standard. Prior
to that time, the EEOC took the position that proof of a claim under the anti-retaliation
provision should be made the same way a claim under the core substantive provision of
the statute is established – that is, by showing that “the [employer] took some sort of
adverse employment-related action against him.”78 Thus, the EEOC endorsed a narrower
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision of the statute, in line with its interpretation
of the core substantive provision, for the first 34 years of the statute’s existence, and only
adopted its broader interpretation in the last eight years.
72

Id. at 1244.
2 EEOC Compliance Manual ¶ 8005, at 6512 (May 20, 1998).
74
Id.
75
Id.; compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (making it unlawful to “discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (prohibiting any
employer from “discriminat[ing] against” any employee who has engaged in protected activity); see also
infra notes __ - ___ and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting core substantive provision of Title
VII with anti-retaliation provision).
76
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., 117 S. Ct. 843, 848 (1997)).
77
Id.
78
2 EEOC Compliance Manual § 614.1(d) (Jan. 1998); see also 2 EEOC Compliance Manual §
614.3(a) (Mar. 1988).
73
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C.

The “Material-Adverse-Action” Standard: The Middle Ground Majority
Approach.

Occupying much of the expanse between the pole positions taken by the Fifth and
Eighth Circuits, on one hand, and the Ninth Circuit and EEOC, on the other, were the
remaining nine circuit courts of appeals. In those circuits, some threshold level of
materiality was required before an employer action could support a retaliation claim
under Title VII. But while these circuits agreed that the employer’s action against the
employee must meet a threshold level of materiality, the application of this standard
varied some from circuit to circuit and case to case, and even engendered conflict as to
how exactly to define the circuit split itself.79 Most notably, the variations arose as to two
distinct issues: (1) what degree of “materiality” was required; and (2) whether the action
must have had some adverse impact on a “term, condition, or privilege” of employment,
as required under the core substantive provision of Title VII.
1.

The Degree of Materiality Required.

The nine courts of appeals falling in this middle ground all stated the relevant
adverse-action standard with substantial similarity. That is, the First, Second, Third,
Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and District of Columbia Circuits all required
some “materially adverse” effect on the employee or her employment in order to state a
claim for retaliation.80 In the majority of cases decided under this standard, which arose
79

Compare, e.g., Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating that the First,
Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits “define adverse employment action broadly” while the Second
and Third Circuits hold “an intermediate position” and placing itself within the “majority” in adopting
ultimate-employment-decision standard), with White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789,
799-800 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc), reh’g en banc denied Apr. 26, 2005, aff’d sub. nom, 126 S. Ct. 2405
(2006) (characterizing Seventh Circuit’s position as most closely aligned with that of Ninth Circuit and
EEOC); see generally Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2006 WL
2055901, at *10 (“The chaos [surrounding the circuit split] is such that courts and commentators even
disagree about how to characterize the various courts of appeals’ positions within the circuit split.”); Lex K.
Larson, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 34.04 [1]-[4] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2006).
80
See, e.g., Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc., 304 F.3d 7, 23 (1st Cir. 2002) (“Work places are
rarely idyllic retreats, and the mere fact that an employee is displeased by an employer’s act or omission
does not elevate that act or omission to the level of a materially adverse employment action.”); Fairbrother
v. Morrison, 412 F.3d 39, 56 (2d Cir. 2005) (“An adverse employment action is a ‘materially adverse
change’ in the terms and conditions of employment.”); Mondzelewski v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 162 F.3d
778 (3d Cir. 1998) (Alito, J.) (in ADA case, drawing upon Title VII cases and requiring “materially adverse
employment action” to support retaliation claim); Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 866 (4th Cir.
2001) (stating that alleged adverse employment action must have “significant” effect on “ ‘terms,
conditions, or benefits’ of the plaintiff’s employment” to support claim); Ford v. General Motors Corp.,
305 F.3d 545, 553 (6th Cir. 2002) (“With respect to the third element of the prima facie case, the adverse
employment action must be ‘materially adverse’ for the plaintiff to succeed on a Title VII claim.” ); Griffin
v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824, 829 (7th Cir. 2004) (“An adverse employment action must be materially adverse,
not merely an inconvenience or a change in job responsibilities.”); Medina v. Income Support Division,
413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005) (stating that actionable adverse action “must be ‘materially adverse’
to the employee’s job status,” is to be determined on a “case-by-case basis” and “does not include ‘a mere
inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities’ ”); Shannon v. Bellsouth Telecomm., Inc., 292 F.3d
712, 716 (11th Cir. 2002) (applying adverse-action standard from Title VII discrimination case, whereby
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in varying factual and legal contexts, the court affirmed judgment as a matter of law in
favor of the defendant employer on plaintiff’s retaliation claim, either at the summary
judgment stage or at trial. For example, courts in the First, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, and
D.C. Circuits have all upheld judgment for the defendant on plaintiff’s claims of varying
forms of retaliatory harassment.81 Likewise, the First, Second, Fourth, Tenth, and D.C.
Circuits have all affirmed defense judgments against claims by plaintiffs arising out of
job reassignments or transfers.82
On the other hand, many of these courts have also found that certain actions,
similar in many respects to those deemed insufficiently material in some cases, were
sufficient to allow the retaliation claim to reach the jury in others. For example, while the
plaintiff’s inter-department transfer and her employer’s tolerance of co-worker
harassment were held by the First Circuit to be insufficient to support plaintiff’s
retaliation claim in Marrero v. Goya of Puerto Rico, Inc.,83 that court found the co-worker
harassment experienced by the plaintiff in Noviello v. City of Boston84 sufficient to allow
her claim to go to a jury. Similarly, while the plaintiff’s transfer to a “floater” position
and poor performance review were found insufficiently material by the Second Circuit in
Fairbrother v. Morrison, the plaintiff’s reassignment involving different responsibilities
and greater contact with the prisoner population and harassment by her co-workers and
supervisors were upheld by that court as sufficient to allow plaintiff’s retaliation claim to
reach a jury in Richardson v. NY State Dep’t of Correctional Servs.85 The D.C. Circuit
held that plaintiff’s allegations of verbal harassment, a change in her work shift, and her
transfer to a different jobsite with less desirable conditions were not actionable in Jones
v. D.C. Department of Corrections,86 but reversed the employer’s summary judgment on
plaintiff’s claim of reduced responsibilities over a period of years in Holcomb v.
Powell.87 Thus, while each of these courts applied the same general standard, requiring
some material adverse change in the plaintiff’s employment to support an actionable
retaliation claim, the application of this standard led to varying results. Of course, these
varying results can in many cases be attributed to distinct differences in factual contexts
in which they arose. Indeed, such variations are at least to be expected and are perhaps
even inevitable. Thus, even in those courts that applied a mostly uniform standard, the
results often could not be predicted with any substantial degree of accuracy. Importantly,
though, the material adversity standard offers at least the opportunity for an objective
employee must show “serious and material change in the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment”
to establish claim); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 902 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
81
Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23; Von Gunten v. Maryland, 243 F.3d 858, 867 (4th Cir. 2001); Munday v.
Waste Management of N. America, Inc., 126 F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1997); Griffin v. Potter, 356 F.3d 824,
829 (7th Cir. 2004); Parkins v. Civil Constructors of Ill., Inc., 359 F.3d 1021, 1029 (7th Cir. 1998); Medina
v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1135 (10th Cir. 2005); Gunnell v. Utah Valley State College, 152
F.3d 1253, 1265 (10th Cir. 1998); Jones v. D.C. Dep’t of Corrections, 429 F.3d 276, 280 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
82
Marrero, 304 F.3d at 23; Fairbrother, 412 F.3d at 56; Von Gunten, 243 F.3d at 868; Boone v.
Goldin, 178 F.3d 253, 255-56 (4th Cir. 1999); Tran v. Trustees of the State Colleges in Colo., 355 F.3d
1263, 1267 (10th Cir. 2004); Jones, 429 F3d at 280.
83
304 F.3d at 26-27.
84
398 F.3d 76, 96-97 (1st Cir. 2005).
85
180 F.3d 426, 444-46 (2d Cir. 1999)
86
429 F.3d at 280.
87
433 F.3d at 902.
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approach that allows employers and courts alike to administer the law with some
predictability, while still permitting the inevitable varying contexts to receive the
attention they deserve.
2.

The Extent to Which the Action Must Be EmploymentRelated.

A related sub-issue also cropped up in some retaliation cases heard in these
“middle-ground” circuits. That is, while most claims of retaliation were based upon
alleged adverse actions related directly to the plaintiff’s employment, some plaintiffs
claimed forms of retaliation occurring outside the workplace. For example, in Berry v.
Stevinson Chevrolet, the plaintiff, a former employee, claimed that after he mentioned he
might file an EEOC charge, a manager at defendant Stevinson Chevrolet initiated a
criminal complaint with the sheriff’s office, alleging that the plaintiff had committed
forgery.88 The trial court awarded plaintiff $265,000 on his retaliation claim, as
compensation for the “ ‘extreme emotional distress, suffering, embarrassment,
humiliation, loss of reputation, standing in the community … he experienced as a
proximate result of [his employer’s] retaliation,’ as well as for the legal fees he incurred
in defending against the theft and forgery charges.”89 On appeal, the defendant/employer
argued that Title VII does not reach the reporting of a suspected crime because such
activity, having little or nothing to do with the plaintiff’s job, cannot constitute an
“unlawful employment practice” as a matter of law.90 The Tenth Circuit rejected
defendant’s argument, holding that “malicious prosecution can constitute adverse
employment action,” and reasoning that because Title VII is remedial in nature, it should
be “liberally construed” to include not only former employees91 (as held in other Tenth
Circuit precedent at the time, and confirmed shortly thereafter by the United States
Supreme Court in Robinson v. Shell Oil Co.92) but also extra-employment acts.93
Further, the Tenth Circuit also reasoned that retaliatory prosecution bears a connection to
present or future employment, in that a criminal trial “is necessarily public and therefore
carries a significant risk of humiliation, damage to reputation, and a concomitant harm to
future employment prospects.”94 Thus, while the Tenth Circuit has consistently required
a retaliation plaintiff to allege an adverse action “ ‘materially adverse’ to the employee’s
job status, . . . such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits,”95 the
court, in what appears to still be good law,96 also did not hesitate to extend the reach of
the anti-retaliation provision to action only indirectly related to the plaintiff’s job.
88

74 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 1996)
Id.
90
Id. at 986.
91
Id.
92
519 U.S. 337, 346 (1997).
93
74 F.3d at 986.
94
Berry, 74 F.3d at 986.
95
See, e.g., Medina v. Income Support Div., 413 F.3d 1131, 1136 (10th Cir. 2005) (emphasis added).
96
Cf. Dick v. Phone Directories Co., 397 F.3d 1256, 1269 (10th Cir. 2005) (distinguishing Berry on
grounds charges against plaintiff had not led to trial and thus she did not suffer same public humiliation and
“concomitant harm to future employment prospects” as plaintiff in Berry).
89
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The District of Columbia Circuit has similarly concluded that the adverse action
alleged in support of a retaliation claim under Title VII need not bear a direct relationship
to the plaintiff’s employment status. In Rochon v. Gonzales, the plaintiff claimed that his
employer, the Federal Bureau of Investigations (“FBI”), retaliated against him for filing a
Title VII lawsuit by refusing to investigate a death threat made by a federal prisoner.97
The court held that an employer action that would be “material to a reasonable employee”
such that it “well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting
a charge of discrimination’ ” is sufficient to support a retaliation claim, “regardless of
whether the alleged retaliatory act is related to the plaintiff’s employment.”98 Thus,
plaintiff’s claim that the FBI failed or refused to investigate a death threat against him,
albeit only peripherally related to his employment, was sufficient to state an actionable
retaliation claim.99
What is perhaps most striking about these decisions is their implication for the
statutory construction question raised by the circuit split. That is, if the anti-retaliation
provision of Title VII was intended to be interpreted in the same manner as the statute’s
core substantive provision, then those courts extending the reach of the former to acts
outside the employment relationship have misapplied the statute. As discussed in more
detail in Part II.A. of this Article, the core substantive provision of Title VII expressly
limits its applicability to those employer actions that discriminate against the employee
“with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.”100
The anti-retaliation provision includes no such express limitation.101 Thus, whether
Congress intended the anti-retaliation provision of the statute to incorporate those same
limitations or not should determine whether it extends to actions that affect the employee
only outside the workplace. The Supreme Court answered this question in White, but, as
discussed in Part VI. below, its decision likely warrants some congressional
intervention.102
D.

The Middle-Ground Majority Approach in Action: The Decisions of the
Lower Courts in White

The decisions of the district and circuit courts in the White case exemplify the
varying results that can flow from application of the middle-ground standard and
demonstrate the need for clearer instruction as to how the law should apply.
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1.

The Events Leading to White’s Lawsuit and Disposition at
the Trial Court.

The Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. (“Burlington”), a railroad
operator in Tennessee, hired Sheila White in June 1997 to work in the Maintenance of
Way Department as a “track laborer,” a position that involved a myriad of duties
including moving track components and material, clearing brush, and removing litter and
spilled cargo from the right-of-way.103 The Burlington supervisor who interviewed
White expressed interest in her previous experience operating forklifts, and when the
department’s forklift operator took a different position shortly after White came to work
there, Burlington assigned White to operate the forklift as her primary duty.104 White
continued to operate the forklift, in addition to performing some of the other track laborer
tasks, for approximately three months.105 In September 1997, White complained to
Burlington management that her immediate supervisor had made inappropriate remarks
to her in front of her all-male colleagues and had told White that women should not work
in the Maintenance of Way Department.106 After conducting an internal investigation,
Burlington suspended White’s supervisor for ten days and required him to attend a
sexual-harassment training session.107 At approximately the same time, Burlington
reassigned White to perform only “standard track laborer tasks.” 108 By way of
explanation, Burlington indicated to her that co-workers had complained that White, the
only female and a relatively new employee, was receiving preferential treatment because
of her sex in that she was assigned the “ ‘less arduous and cleaner job’ of forklift
operator.”109
White filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC on October 10, 1997,
claiming that her reassignment to standard track laborer duties constituted unlawful sex
discrimination and retaliation for her complaint about her supervisor’s harassment.110
She filed a second EEOC charge in December, claiming that Burlington’s managers had
placed her under surveillance and were scrutinizing her daily activities.111 Shortly after
Burlington received the second charge, White and her immediate supervisor had a
disagreement, which led her supervisor to report White to management as insubordinate
and place her on immediate suspension without pay.112 Pursuant to the internal grievance
procedures provided in the company’s collective bargaining agreement, Burlington
conducted an internal investigation, and concluded after 37 days that the suspension was
unwarranted because White had not in fact been insubordinate.113 Thus, Burlington
103
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reinstated White with back pay for the 37 days of her suspension.114 She then filed an
additional EEOC charge alleging retaliation based on the suspension.115
White subsequently filed a lawsuit in the Western District of Tennessee based on
these events, claiming that Burlington discriminated against her on the basis of her sex
and retaliated against her for complaining about alleged sex discrimination by reassigning
her from forklift operator duties to standard track laborer tasks and by suspending her
without pay for 37 days.116 The case was tried to a jury from August 29, 2000 to
September 5, 2000. At the conclusion of trial, the jury returned a verdict in Burlington’s
favor on White’s sex discrimination claim but in White’s favor on her retaliation claim,
awarding $43,500 in compensatory damages, including $3,250 in medical expenses
incurred to treat alleged emotional distress during her suspension.117 Burlington then
filed a renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on White’s retaliation claim,
which the court denied, and Burlington sought timely appeal.118
2.

Reversal by a Three-Judge Panel of the Sixth Circuit.

A three-judge panel of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
reversed the trial court’s denial of Burlington’s motion for judgment as a matter of law on
November 13, 2002.119 Explaining the applicable standard, the court stated:
“[A] plaintiff must identify a materially adverse change in the terms and
conditions of his employment to state a claim for retaliation under Title
VII.”… A material adverse change includes a termination in employment,
a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less distinguished
title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material
responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a particular
situation. … Importantly, a change in employment conditions “ ‘must be
more disruptive than a mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities.’ ”120
The court then proceeded to address the two actions alleged by White as adverse,
concluding in turn that each failed to satisfy the requisite standard.121 First, as to White’s
reassignment from forklift duties to standard track-laborer tasks, the court found that she
suffered no reduction in pay or benefits and was given neither significantly diminished
material responsibilities nor a less prestigious job title.122 As such, her reassignment
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constituted a non-actionable “lateral transfer,” at most.123 Moreover, the court rejected
White’s contention that her reassignment could support a retaliation claim because the
standard track laborer tasks were more “physically demanding” than operating a forklift:
The fact that forklift duty is less physically demanding than track
maintenance work does not make White's reassignment a cognizable
adverse employment action. The railroad hired White as a track
maintenance worker. One of her explicit job responsibilities was to
maintain the railroad tracks. We fail to see how White suffered an adverse
employment action by being directed to do a job duty for which
Burlington Northern hired her. 124
The court likewise concluded that White’s temporary suspension followed by a
reinstatement with back pay failed to rise to the level of a cognizable material adverse
employment action. Here, the court relied heavily on its conclusion that the suspension
was not the employer’s final act but rather was only an intermediate step in its decisionmaking process.125 The court cited its own precedent, in which a university professor’s
retaliation claim was rejected where the initial denial of her application for tenure was
subsequently reversed through an internal grievance process and she was awarded tenure
with full back pay and benefits to the date tenure was initially denied. The court
concluded that White likewise suffered no “final or lasting adverse employment action”
sufficient to support her claim.126 Notably, the court here apparently departed from its
own precedent and applied the more exacting “ultimate-employment-decision” standard
in this part of the opinion.127 Indeed, rather than citing any of its own precedents in
support of its conclusions, the court instead cited to Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co.,128 the
seminal Fifth Circuit case adopting the ultimate-employment-decision standard.129 Prior
to its decision in White I, however, the court had repeatedly required only that plaintiff
show a materially adverse employment action to support a retaliation claim,130 and had
only applied the higher threshold of an ultimate employment decision in a few cases,
most of which did not include claims under the anti-retaliation provision but instead
asserted claims of discrimination.131
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3.

The Sixth Circuit’s En Banc Decision Affirming the Trial
Court.

Perhaps because of this departure from Sixth Circuit precedent, perhaps because
of the circuit split, or perhaps for some other reason, the Sixth Circuit granted plaintiff
rehearing en banc, vacating the panel’s decision in White I.132 Contrary to the result
reached by the panel, the en banc court affirmed the trial court’s denial of Burlington’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law on April 14, 2004.133 After stating the facts of the
case, the court began by discussing the evolution of the relevant Sixth-Circuit precedent
and identified Kocsis v. Multi-Care Management, Inc., as “the seminal case for defining
adverse employment action.” 134 Kocsis was a disability discrimination case brought
under the Americans With Disabilities Act, in which the court required the plaintiff to
show that she suffered “ ‘a materially adverse change in the terms of her employment’ ”
to support her claim.135 The court extended this standard in the Title VII retaliation
context in Hollins v. Atlantic Co., where it held that the plaintiff’s lower performance
evaluation ratings failed to rise to the level of a materially adverse employment action.136
Adhering to these precedents, the en banc court in White II rejected White’s suggestion
that it adopt the EEOC’s broad definition of adverse employment action as “ ‘any adverse
treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is reasonably likely to deter a charging
party or others from engaging in protected activity’ ” and instead reaffirmed the materialadverse-employment-action standard.137 The court reasoned that “[s]ince the adverseemployment action element developed by this Circuit is an exception to a broad, strictly
literal reading of Title VII’s anti-discrimination provisions, we will continue to define the
exception narrowly so as not to frustrate the purpose of Title VII while deterring lawsuits
over trivial matters.”138 Moreover, the court went on to disapprove of its own reference
to the “ultimate-employment-decision” standard in Dobbs-Weinstein, questioning that
panel’s reliance on outdated Fourth Circuit case law and ultimately joining “the majority
of other circuits in rejecting the ‘ultimate employment decision’ standard.”139
Applying the material-adverse-action standard to the facts, the court first
concluded that White’s suspension without pay was sufficiently adverse to support her
claim of retaliation.140 The fact that White challenged the suspension decision and that
Burlington later “corrected” its action by reinstating White with full back pay and
benefits was not, according to the court, sufficient to deprive White of her right to
recover for unlawful retaliation under Title VII.141 “The alleged discriminatory decision
132
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… was the suspension without pay.”142 This decision was sufficiently adverse, according
to the court, to support White’s retaliation claim.143
The court likewise concluded that White’s reassignment from forklift operator
duties to standard track laborer tasks constituted an actionable adverse employment
action.144 Reasoning that her new position “was by all accounts more arduous and
‘dirtier,’ ” and that “the forklift operator position was objectively considered a better
job,” the court held that White’s job transfer was also sufficient to support her claim.145
The position taken by the majority of the en banc court in White II met with very
little disagreement, drawing only one additional opinion on the issue relevant here, and
that one concurring in the result. That is, Judge Clay agreed with the majority that
White’s reassignment and her temporary suspension without pay rose to the level of
actionable adverse employment actions, and supported the majority’s rejection of the
“ultimate employment decision” standard as applied in Dobbs-Weinstein.146 Judge Clay
wrote separately, however, because he disagreed with the material-adverse-employmentaction standard adopted by the majority.147 Instead, he supported the standard adopted by
the Ninth Circuit and the EEOC, whereby a plaintiff could establish the adverse-action
element of a prima facie case of retaliation by showing that the employer’s decision
“would be ‘reasonably likely to deter [employees] from engaging in protected activity.’
”148 Thus, he disagreed with the majority that the language of and policy behind the
statute suggest application of the same “materially adverse” standard under the antiretaliation provision as under the anti-discrimination provision, and instead believed that
the standard under the anti-retaliation provision should be broader, promoting greater
access to the statute’s remedial scheme and, concomitantly, requiring that employers treat
employees who have engaged in protected activity more carefully than those in the other
classes of employees protected by Title VII.
Dissatisfied with the new result, Burlington first sought rehearing from the en
banc court of appeals. When the court denied its request on April 26, 2005, Burlington
saw review by the United States Supreme Court as its best and only option. Thus,
Burlington filed a Petition for a Writ of Certiorari on August 24, 2005, requesting that the
Court grant review to answer the following question presented:
Whether an employer may be held liable for retaliatory discrimination
under Title VII for any “materially adverse change in the terms of
employment” (including temporary suspension rescinded by the employer
with full back pay or an inconvenient reassignment, as the court below
held); for any adverse treatment that was “reasonably likely to deter” the
plaintiff from engaging in protected activity (as the Ninth Circuit holds);
142
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or only for an “ultimate employment decision” (as two other courts of
appeals hold).149
In support of its Petition, Burlington placed primary emphasis on the confusion flowing
from the circuit split as to the adverse-action standard in a Title VII retaliation case.150 In
addition, Burlington urged the Court to grant review because “the issue arises with great
frequency,” both in the Title VII context and under other federal employment statutes, as
well; and because “the ruling below will jeopardize legitimate employer practices by the
imposition of unwarranted and unpredictable litigation risk.”151
4.

The Supreme Court’s Grant of Certiorari and the Parties’
Briefs to the Court.

The Supreme Court granted review on December 5, 2005.152 In its Brief to the
Court, Burlington argued that the same adverse-action standard, defined by the Supreme
Court in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth as a “tangible employment action,” applies
under both the anti-retaliation provision and the core substantive provision of Tile VII,
and that White could not satisfy that standard.153 Burlington pointed to both the language
of the statute and its legislative purposes in support of its position that the two parts of
Title VII have the same meaning, and that the Court’s precedent in Ellerth should
control.154
Burlington then turned to the facts of White’s case and argued that her
reassignment from forklift duties to standard track laborer tasks and her temporary
suspension followed by reinstatement with full back pay failed to meet this “tangible
employment action” standard. As to the former, Burlington emphasized that White was
in fact hired not as a forklift operator per se, but as a track laborer more generally, with
forklift operation being one of the many duties that she might be assigned.155 She
therefore could not prove any adverse change in her compensation or in the terms,
conditions, or privileges of her job, because she remained at all times in the job for which
she was hired.156 Burlington likewise argued that White’s temporary suspension did not
suffice because, being only “temporary and tentative,” it was “not the official act of the
enterprise” and therefore could not support employer liability.157 Further, such an act
should not be actionable as a matter of policy, said Burlington, because employers need
149
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the discretion to act promptly upon alleged workplace rule violations, which further
promotes Title VII’s preference for “conciliation” and “voluntary compliance” over
litigation.158
White’s opposition brief answered Burlington’s by focusing similarly on the
language of the statute and its underlying policies, in turn. 159 White urged that the antiretaliation provision should be interpreted on its face, and that it does not include any
materiality requirement.160 Instead, according to White, the statute requires only that the
alleged “discriminat[ion]” be “against” the employee.161 Although White never clearly
articulated the standard she proposed, she contended Burlington’s proposed interpretation
found support in neither the language of the statute, its underlying policies, nor Supreme
Court precedents. Then, White focused the remainder of her brief on proving her
temporary suspension amply sufficient to support her retaliation claim and the jury
verdict in her favor.162 Specifically, White contended that an employer cannot cure an
unlawful suspension simply by later reinstating the employee with back pay; instead, the
employer should remain liable for its wrongful acts, regardless of its subsequent
conduct.163 The fact that Burlington later rescinded the initial decision of its supervisory
employee to suspend White should not relieve Burlington of liability for its wrongful
act.164
White also filed a “Supplemental Brief” in response to the brief filed by the
United States as amicus curiae.165 Notably, the amicus brief filed by the government
supported the judgment in White’s favor.166 She filed a critical response, however, to
express disapproval of the material-adverse-action standard the government supported, on
grounds that it was unworkable as a matter of statutory interpretation and of policy. 167
The briefing closed with a reply filed by Burlington.168 The Court heard oral
argument on April 17, 2006. The case was then submitted to the Court for decision.
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IV.

THE SUPREME COURT STEPS INTO THE FRAY: WHITE PREVAILS
UNDER A NEW FORMULATION OF THE “MATERIAL ADVERSITY”
STANDARD.

The Supreme Court issued its decision two months later on June 22, 2006.169 The
Court’s nine justices agreed unanimously that the actions taken against White – a
reassignment of job duties and a temporary suspension followed by reinstatement with
back pay – were sufficient to support the jury’s verdict in her favor.170 Only eight of the
nine justices, however, joined the majority opinion authored by Justice Breyer.171 Justice
Alito wrote separately to express his disagreement with the majority’s interpretation of
the anti-retaliation provision, though he reached the same result under an alternative
analysis.172
A.

The Majority Opinion: New Standard, No Clarity.

The Court’s analysis began just as one might expect – with the language of the
statute.173 The Court identified the anti-retaliation provision’s use of the term
“discriminate against” as the focal point, and stated that while “[n]o one doubts that the
term ‘discriminate against’ refers to distinctions or differences in treatment that injure
protected individuals,” the Circuit Courts of Appeals nevertheless disagree on the
answers to two related questions concerning this terminology: (1) whether it
encompasses harms that occur outside the workplace or are not job-related; and (2) the
requisite level of harmfulness to which the retaliatory discrimination must rise.174
According to the Court, then, resolving this disagreement required it to answer both of
those questions in this case.175 The Court addressed each in turn, then discussed how the
conclusions it reached bore on the present facts. Thus, one can state the majority’s
holding in three parts: (1) that the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII is broader than
the statute’s core substantive provision insofar as it encompasses employer actions and
harms that either occur outside the workplace or are otherwise non-work-related; (2) that
a plaintiff claiming violation of the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII must show that
the alleged employer action would have been materially adverse to a reasonable
employee in the plaintiff’s position, meaning that it “might well have dissuaded a
reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination”; and (3) that
White’s reassignment and suspension satisfy that standard.176
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1.

The Court Extends the Anti-Retaliation Provision to Reach NonWorkplace Harms.

The Court’s discussion of the first question, as to whether the anti-retaliation
provision reaches non-workplace harms, focused primarily on a comparison of the antiretaliation provision to the statute’s core substantive provision.177 Specifically, the Court
placed great weight on Congress’s omission from the anti-retaliation section of language
defining the types of harms covered by the statute’s core substantive provision as those
actions that affect the employee’s “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.”178 The anti-retaliation provision, by contrast, refers only to
“discriminat[ion],” and contains no further description or limitation as to the sort of
harmful act it prohibits.179 These “linguistic differences” led the Court to presume that
Congress intended the provisions to cover different acts, a presumption for which the
Court found ample support in the purposes of the provisions.180 According to the Court,
“the anti-discrimination provision seeks a workplace where individuals are not
discriminated against because of their racial, ethnic, religious, or gender-based status.”181
The anti-retaliation provision, on the other hand, “seeks to secure that primary objective
by preventing an employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s
efforts to secure or advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”182 As such, the
Court held, the substantive provision seeks to accomplish its goals by simply prohibiting
employment-related discrimination: “The substantive provision’s basic objective of
‘equality of employment opportunities’ and the elimination of practices that tend to bring
about ‘stratified job environments,’ . . . would be achieved were all employment-related
discrimination miraculously eliminated.”183 The Court could not say the same of the antiretaliation provision, though, as it found that “[a]n employer can effectively retaliate
against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or by
causing him harm outside the workplace.”184 As such, the Court concluded that the
“purpose reinforces what the language already indicates, namely, that the anti-retaliation
provision, unlike the substantive provision, is not limited to discriminatory actions that
affect the terms and conditions of employment.”185
177
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To further reinforce its conclusion, the Court also discussed the failure of either
its own precedents or EEOC authorities to support Burlington’s proposed interpretation.
First, the Court rejected Burlington’s suggestion that the Court’s decision in Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth supplies the appropriate standard under the anti-retaliation
provision.186 To the contrary, the Court stated that “Ellerth did not mention Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision at all” and therefore has no bearing on this case.187 Instead, the
Court limited Ellerth’s holding as defining the term “tangible employment action” only
for the purpose of “ ‘identify[ing] a class of [hostile work environment] cases’ in which
an employer should be held vicariously liable (without an affirmative defense) for the
acts of supervisors.”188 Ellerth did not, therefore, as Burlington suggested and as many
Circuit Courts had found, define the scope of actionable adverse employment decisions
under Title VII generally. Its holding, said the Court, was far more limited.
The Court likewise found no support for Burlington’s position from the EEOC.
The Court conceded that earlier versions of the EEOC’s Compliance Manuals limited the
scope of the anti-retaliation provision to “adverse employment-related action.”189
However, the EEOC promoted a broader interpretation not only elsewhere in those same
Manuals but also in other Commission publications during that same time.190 Moreover,
and more importantly, said the Court, the EEOC’s latest version of the Compliance
Manual addressed to the anti-retaliation provision reflects its only direct statement on the
scope of that provision and interprets it far more broadly than Burlington proposed.191
Finally, the Court rejected Burlington’s suggestion that interpreting the antiretaliation provision to provide greater protection to victims of retaliation than victims of
discrimination is illogical.192 Such an interpretation best serves the differing purposes of
the two provisions by assuring that employers provide the “cooperation upon which
accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.”193 Moreover, the Court noted
that Congress has similarly afforded broader protection to victims of retaliation in other
contexts, citing to the National Labor Relations Act’s prohibition of “discrimination in
regard to … any term or condition of employment” in that statute’s substantive provision
and its broader prohibition of not only “discharge” but also other forms of
“discriminat[ion]” in the anti-retaliation provision.194 Thus, the Court concluded, Title
VII’s anti-retaliation provision is broader than its core substantive provision, at least
insofar as it “extends beyond workplace-related or employment-related retaliatory acts
and harm.”195
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2.

The Court Adopts a Material Adversity Standard With Alternative
Objective and Subjective Components.

Next, the Court turned to the second question raised by the circuit split, as to the
scope of retaliatory acts that the statute prohibits. Here, the Court struck a middle ground
between the standards proposed by the parties and held that “a plaintiff must show that a
reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which
in this context means it well might have ‘dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.’ ”196 Explaining its conclusion, the Court reasoned
that “material adversity” is required in order “to separate significant from trivial harms”
in light of the fact that Title VII “does not set forth ‘a general civility code for the
American workplace.’ ”197 The “petty slights” and “minor annoyances” weeded out by
the materiality standard would not, said the Court, create the deterrence problem against
which the anti-retaliation provision is intended to protect.198 Thus, the Court concluded
that the materiality standard strikes the appropriate balance because it “will screen out
trivial conduct while effectively capturing those acts that are likely to dissuade employees
from complaining or assisting in complaints about discrimination.”199
The Court also instructed that while courts should apply its standard objectively,
“context matters.”200 Thus, the Court purported to ensure that its standard was “judicially
administrable” by focusing attention on the “reactions of a reasonable employee.”
Nevertheless, the Court indicated that the specific circumstances surrounding each
employee’s situation must be taken into account.201 The Court provided two examples:
A schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little
difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young
mother with school age children. … A supervisor’s refusal to invite an
employee to lunch is normally trivial, a nonactionable petty slight. But to
retaliate by excluding an employee from a weekly training lunch that
contributes significantly to the employee’s professional advancement
might well deter a reasonable employee from complaining about
discrimination. Hence, a legal standard that speaks in general terms rather
than specific prohibited acts is preferable, for an “act that would be
immaterial in some situations is material in others.” 202
Thus, the Court’s standard requires that a plaintiff’s alleged adverse action be one that
would deter a reasonable, objectively-viewed employee, but one in the plaintiff’s specific
position, from complaining about discrimination. These examples therefore inject
substantial subjectivity into the Court’s nominally objective standard. The biggest
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problems with White’s holding originate here, as will be discussed in more detail
below.203
3.

The Court Upholds White’s Retaliation Claims Based on the
Reassignment of Her Job Duties and Her Temporary Unpaid
Suspension.

The Court then applied its standard to the facts of White’s case. Turning first to
White’s reassignment from forklift duties to standard track-laborer tasks, the Court
recognized that changing an employee’s job duties, even within the employee’s existing
job description, might well amount to retaliation insofar as requiring an employee to
perform “more arduous” tasks rather than “those that are easier or more agreeable” could
deter a reasonable employee from complaining about discrimination or participating in
the discrimination-investigation process.204 The Court’s analysis went further, however,
to take account of “the circumstances of [White’s] particular case.”205 Here, the Court
noted that “the jury had before it considerable evidence that the track laborer tasks were
‘by all accounts more arduous and dirtier’; that the ‘forklift operator position required
more qualifications, which is an indication of prestige’; and that ‘the forklift operator
position was objectively considered a better job and the male employees resented White
for occupying it.’ ”206 As such, the Court determined that the evidence supported the
jury’s verdict in White’s favor, as “the reassignment of responsibilities would have been
materially adverse to a reasonable employee.”207
The Court reached a similar conclusion with respect to White’s 37-day unpaid
suspension. Here, the Court again engaged a two-part analysis, concluding first that
“[m]any reasonable employees would find a month without a paycheck to be a serious
hardship” and, second, that White in particular found the suspension difficult, in that she
had no income at Christmas, became very depressed, and ultimately obtained medical
treatment for her emotional distress.208 Thus, the Court concluded that a 37-day
suspension “could well act as a deterrent” to engaging in protected activity and therefore
was sufficiently adverse to support White’s claim.209 Moreover, the fact that Burlington
later rescinded its suspension decision and reinstated White with full back pay was of no
consequence.210 The Court rejected Burlington’s contention that because Title VII,
throughout much of its history, provided only for equitable relief, it should not be
interpreted to encompass this case simply because Title VII was amended in 1991 to
permit recovery of compensatory and punitive damages.211 Indeed, such an amendment,
said the Court, provides further support for the conclusion that Congress intended to
afford a right of recovery to plaintiffs in White’s position, as Congress’s expressed
203
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intention in affording such remedies was to “ ‘help make victims whole.’ ”212 Thus, the
Court concluded that both of the retaliatory acts alleged by White could support her
claim, as both would deter not only a reasonable person in general, but also one in
plaintiff’s specific position, from engaging in the enforcement activities the antiretaliation provision encourages.
4.

Without Complete Unanimity: Justice Alito’s Concurring Opinion.

While he agreed with the Court’s ultimate conclusion that the employer decisions
alleged by White were sufficient to support her retaliation claim, Justice Alito wrote
separately to express his disagreement with the adverse-action standard announced by the
Court. According to Alito, the anti-retaliation provision suggests only two possible
interpretations.213 The first – the one “staunchly defend[ed]” by White – “makes
[section] 703 narrower in scope than [section] 704 and thus implies that the persons
whom Title VII is principally designed to protect – victims of discrimination based on
race, color, sex, national origin, or religion – receive less protection than victims of
retaliation” and also “ ‘makes a federal case’ out of any small difference in the way an
employee who has engaged in protected conduct is treated.”214 Alito expressed “doubt
that Congress meant to burden the federal courts with claims involving [such] relatively
trivial differences in treatment,” and therefore found the second possible interpretation –
that adopted by the majority of the Circuit Courts of Appeals – more plausible.215 Under
this interpretation, the anti-retaliation provision reaches the same discriminatory acts as
the statute’s core substantive provision – i.e., only those that are “materially adverse” to a
reasonable person. Alito praised this standard both for its objectivity and for its ability to
“weed[] out” insignificant claims on summary judgment motions, “while providing
ample protection for employees who are subject to real retaliation.”216 Moreover,
contrary to the majority, Alito found support for this interpretation in the Court’s decision
in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, as the Court there “ ‘import[ed]’ this test for use
in a different context – to define the term ‘tangible employment action,’ a concept we
used to limit an employer’s liability for harassment carried out by its supervisors.”217
Alito then proceeded to criticize the interpretation adopted by the majority for
lacking support in the language of the statute. First, Alito denounced the Court’s reliance
on its view that the Act’s “only purpose” is prevention of employer decisions that might
deter protected activity, explaining that such a narrow view is inaccurate.218 This view is
too narrow, according to Alito, because it fails to account for other purposes plausibly
served by the Act, including the prevention of harm to individuals, a purpose expressly
recognized elsewhere in the majority opinion.219 Second, Alito forecast that the
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majority’s “well might dissuade a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge
of discrimination” test would “lead to perverse results” because it would require a court
to take account of the nature and severity of the discrimination claimed by the employee
in order to engage in a cost-benefit comparison of suffering the alleged discrimination
quietly versus risking retaliation for complaining. That is, Alito pointed out, the threat of
retaliation is much less likely to deter the victim of the severest forms of discrimination
than the victim of less significant acts. As such, the majority’s deterrence standard would
function illogically to afford relief from retaliation to fewer victims of severe
discrimination, and more victims of de minimis discrimination, who are more likely to be
dissuaded from engaging in protected activity.220 Further, Alito attacked the majority’s
standard as unclear, insofar as it purports to be objective but still requires a court to take
account of some unidentified set of individual characteristics, such as whether the
employee has young children at home, and what the employee’s family financial situation
might be.221 Finally, but without much explanation, Alito condemned the majority’s test
as supplying a “loose and unfamiliar causation standard” – one that he found unwelcome
“in an area of the law in which standards of causation are already complex.”222 Alito
therefore disagreed with the majority’s formulation of the relevant adverse-action
standard and proposed instead that the anti-retaliation provision should reach the same
discriminatory acts covered by the statute’s core substantive provision.223 While
concededly not the most loyal to the plain language of the statute, such an interpretation
would, according to Alito, afford sufficient protection to victims of “real” retaliation
while providing an objective standard that the judiciary could administer with substantial
clarity.224
Alito concluded by applying his material-adversity standard to the facts of
White’s case, and reached the same conclusion as the majority. That is, Burlington’s
decision to assign White new duties that were admittedly “more arduous” and “dirtier,”
as well as less prestigious, amounted in essence to a demotion and was therefore amply
sufficient to support her claim.225 Alito likewise determined, though without
explanation, that White’s 37-day unpaid suspension also satisfied his formulation of the
relevant standard. Thus, although their paths differed, Alito and the majority eventually
reached the same destination.
V.

THE WAYWARD WAYS OF THE COURT: AN UNWORKABLY VAGUE
AND IMPRACTICAL STANDARD THAT FAILS TO MEET STATED OR
NECESSARY GOALS

The analytical approach taken in the majority and the concurring opinions in
White properly focuses on the language of the statute but does so from such a narrow
vantage that the Court fails to take sufficient account of other important statutory220
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224
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interpretation criteria, the careful of consideration of which ought to lead to a somewhat
different result. As the Court has repeatedly stated, the first step in the statutoryinterpretation process is to determine whether the language of the statute at issue is plain
and unambiguous.226 Where the language is plain and unambiguous, no interpretation is
necessary and the court must enforce the statute as written.227 Ambiguity exists only
when the statutory language, on its face as well as in context, “is capable of being
understood by reasonably well-informed persons in two or more different senses.”228
Thus, if the court finds that the language of the statute is ambiguous, then the court
endeavors to discern its meaning by reference to what its drafters intended.229 This
process should involve inquiry into three matters: (1) the language of the statute in both
the narrow context in which it appears and the broader context of the statute as a whole;
(2) the policy goals or purposes that the statute serves, as reflected in its legislative
history and/or elsewhere; and (3) the reasonableness of the proposed interpretation in
light of practical considerations.230
While the Court in White gave some consideration to the language of the antiretaliation provision and its context, as well as at least one of its purposes, the Court did
not go far enough in its inquiries. As a result, the Court’s interpretation of the antiretaliation provision is inconsistent with the language of Title VII in its broader context,
fails to fulfill the policy goals of the statute as a whole, and implements an unworkably
vague standard that is wholly impractical in the real world. In the remaining Parts V and
VI of this Article, I will discuss each of these problems with the White decision in turn,
and then offer a proposal to remedy the situation. Thus, in subpart V.A., below, I will
show how the Court’s narrow view of the anti-retaliation provision alone without
226
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sufficient reference to the context in which it appears leads the Court to interpret the
statute more broadly than the statutory language and structure warrant. In subpart V.B., I
will turn to the Court’s singular focus on unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms as the primary or only goal of the anti-retaliation provision and demonstrate
that it disregards and even contravenes other equally important statutory purposes. In
subpart V.C., I will explain how the interpretation adopted by the Court unjustifiably ties
the hands of employers and implements a standard that will lead to continued lack of
clarity in the lower courts. Finally, in Part VI., I will offer a solution to the problems that
the Court’s decision in White creates and propose a revision to the statute’s antiretaliation provision that will change the relevant standard to better fit the context of the
statute as a whole and better fulfill its broader policy goals. Because the effect of stare
decisis in a case like this is so strong, these problems cannot easily be remedied by
further Court action.231 Instead, Congress should intervene to overrule legislatively the
Court’s decision in White and impose a clearer anti-retaliation standard that is more loyal
to the statute’s language and underlying purposes.
A.

The Court Makes a Rocky Start: Neither the Statutory Language Nor its
Context Compel the Majority’s Interpretation.

The first problem with the Court’s analysis is its narrow view of the statutory
language that fails to take sufficient account of the broader context in which the antiretaliation provision appears. This problem is not apparent at first blush. Indeed, the
Court began its analysis much as one might expect, focused on the statutory language and
honing in on the term “discriminate against” as critical.232 Breezing past any inquiry into
whether the statute contains an ambiguity needing interpretation, the Court summarily
concluded that “[n]o one doubts that the term ‘discriminate against’ refers to distinctions
or differences in treatment that injure protected individuals.”233 The Court proceeded to
recognize that, notwithstanding this declaredly universal truth, courts have disagreed as
to “whether the challenged action has to be employment or workplace related and … how
harmful that action must be to constitute retaliation.”234 After highlighting the circuit
split on this issue, the Court acknowledged that some courts read the language of these
two similar, but not identical, provisions in pari materia – the position advocated to the
Court by Burlington.235 Most such courts thus conclude, as urged by Burlington, that the
term “discriminate against” should be read to mean the same thing in both provisions, so
that both encompass the same scope of employer actions, not only as to employmentrelatedness (i.e. workplace harms only) but also as to severity.236 The Court rejected this
position, though, and found instead that “[t]he language of the substantive provision
differs from that of the anti-retaliation provision in important ways.”237 Specifically, the
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Court accorded great weight to the substantive provision’s use of the terms “hire,”
“discharge,” and “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,” which
terms are conspicuously absent from the anti-retaliation provision.238 The Court therefore
“presume[d]” that “Congress intended its different words to make a legal difference,” and
proceeded to justify its conclusion in light of statutory purposes.239
While the Court’s analysis here fairly encompassed the language of not just the
anti-retaliation provision but also the statute’s core substantive provision, the Court still
stopped short, focusing its attention too narrowly and leaving its result consequently
flawed. A broader scope of inquiry in at least two different respects at this statutorylanguage-focused interpretive phase would likely have at least left open the possibility of
contrary results, instead of leading the Court so quickly to “presume” that any difference
in language reflects intentionally different meaning.
First, and pertinent specifically to the Court’s first holding (that the antiretaliation provision encompasses non-workplace harms),240 the Court never discussed
the fact that both sections 703(a) and 704(a) define “an unlawful employment
practice.”241 That terminology appears prominently at the beginning of not only the first
subpart of the core substantive provision, but also nearly every other subpart thereafter,
each of which makes it “an unlawful employment practice” for the type of entity covered
by that subpart (e.g., an employment agency,242 a labor organization,243 a joint labormanagement committee controlling apprenticeship244) to “discriminate against any
individual because of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” The antiretaliation provision is identical insofar as Congress therein made it “an unlawful
employment practice” to “discriminate against” those individuals who engage in
protected activity.245
Congress’s repeated reference to “an unlawful employment practice,” as opposed
to, for example, “an unlawful practice” more generally, surely is not unintentional. Such
specific, prominent, and repeated reference to employment practices warrants at least
mention, if not more detailed attention, in an analysis of whether the statute encompasses
wrongs outside of or that do not depend on an employment relationship. Indeed, to
disregard (or at least exclude discussion of) this statutory language, as did the Court, is
disloyal to the cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that effect should be given to every
word, clause and sentence of a statute.246 The Court’s singular focus on Congress’s
238
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omission from the anti-retaliation provision of certain words describing the kind of
discrimination made actionable under the statute’s core substantive provision results in an
overly narrow analysis that misses a key point. While such distinctions should not be
disregarded entirely, Congress’s use of the term “employment practice” in labeling the
activities made unlawful by the statute is more instructive on the question of whether the
statute encompasses non-workplace harms than is its extrapolation, or not, on the basic
term “discriminate against” in describing the prohibited acts themselves. The statute
prohibits “discriminat[ion],” whatever that term may include, but only activities that
constitute “employment practices” need be considered in the first place.
None of this is to suggest that Congress’s use of the term “employment practices”
is alone sufficient to justify a conclusion that the Act does not include non-workplace
harms. But the Court’s narrow focus on the term “discriminate against” and its modifiers
inappropriately disregards other key language in the operative provisions of the statute.
The result is that the Court too quickly concludes (or “presume[s],” as the case may be)
that the core substantive provision and the anti-retaliation provision have different
meanings, when a closer look at the statutory language in context would reveal striking
and important similarities. Thus, consideration of Congress’s repeated reference to
“employment practices” in defining the conduct made unlawful by the statute does not
necessarily compel a different result than that reached by the Court on the facts of White,
but at least leaves open the possibility for future cases that the anti-retaliation provision
does not encompass non-workplace harms.
The same error plagues the Court’s second holding – that the anti-retaliation
provision prohibits any employer conduct that is “materially adverse,” such that it “well
might” dissuade a reasonable worker in the plaintiff’s position from “making or
supporting a charge of discrimination.”247 Indeed, the Court here engaged in no separate
analysis at all of the statutory language or context, relying instead on its earlier
conclusion that the two provisions of the statute are different, and proceeding to justify its
proposed standard in light of statutory policy and its own precedents.248 Again, however,
had the Court expanded the breadth of its inquiry into the statutory language and context,
its conclusion would no longer be justifiable because the statutory language does not
support the Court’s test. As Justice Alito points out in his concurring opinion, the antiretaliation provision on its face simply prohibits “discriminat[ion] against” employees
who engage in protected activity. 249 The plainest meaning of this term would encompass
almost any and every difference in treatment that negatively impacts protected
individuals. Indeed, the majority’s own definition of “discriminate against,” which it
accepts without question, supports this interpretation.250 The Court did not, however,
adopt this “plain meaning” interpretation. Instead, the Court implicitly, and I believe
247
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correctly, recognized that such a broad interpretation is inconsistent with the statute’s
underlying purposes.251 As such, the task before the Court turned to determining just
what the scope of that provision should be within the broad range of standards one might
propose. But the Court did not turn to the language or context of the statute for guidance,
as the rules of statutory construction would first advise.252 Rather, the Court looked
straight to its (narrow) perceptions of the statute’s purposes, and concluded without
further reference to the language or context of the statute at all, that it prohibits
“materially adverse” employer actions that “well might dissuade” a reasonable worker in
the plaintiff’s position from engaging in protected activity.253
Without regard for now254 to whether the purposes underlying Title VII support
the standard adopted by the majority, it finds no support in the statutory language or
context.255 Nothing about the statutory language or its context suggests that Congress
intended to prohibit employer actions that “might dissuade a reasonable worker” in the
plaintiff’s position from engaging in protected activity, as no part of the statute references
either expressly or implicitly that deterrence is a critical factor in the actionability of a
claim, or indeed that it is even involved. Rather, the more logical intrinsic interpretive
aid in these circumstances is the very provision that the Court casts aside – the other part
of the statute that likewise makes certain “employment practices” “unlawful” – i.e., the
core substantive provision.
Justice Alito would have taken this approach. He agreed with the majority (and
with me) that the plainest interpretation – also the broadest – is not satisfactory.256 He
suggested that the only “other plausible interpretation . . . reads [sections] 703(a) and
704(a) together … [so that] ‘discriminat[ion] under § 704(a) means the discriminatory
acts reached by 703(a) – chiefly, discrimination ‘with respect to … compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment.’ ”257 Alito then cited to lower court decisions
applying a “material adverse action” standard under both provisions on this basis, as well
as the fact that the Supreme Court had previously “ ‘import[ed]’ ” that same material
adverse action standard to define “tangible employment action” in the context of
employer vicarious liability, as support for his conclusion that it should also apply
here.258
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Justice Alito’s reasoning is not entirely clear and perhaps does not even justify the
result he reaches. First, the fact that numerous circuit courts applied a “material adverse
action” standard upon concluding that the anti-retaliation provision should carry the same
meaning as the core substantive provision does not necessarily compel the Supreme
Court to reach the same conclusion. Second, as discussed above,259 the Supreme Court’s
“import[ation]” of the material adverse action standard to define “tangible employment
action” in Ellerth does not necessarily mean, or even suggest, that the same standard
applies here. The Ellerth holding pertained specifically to principles of agency law, and
the Court drew upon the lower courts’ adverse-action standard to mark the dividing line
between those supervisory acts for which the employer will be strictly liable and those for
which the employer may be liable only if negligent.260 Although Ellerth certainly does
not close the door to application of that same material-adverse-action standard under the
anti-retaliation provision, it does not demand that result. At a minimum, some rationale
to justify applying Ellerth in this context is needed.
Notwithstanding the shortcomings of Justice Alito’s reasoning, though, the
premise from which he starts is a sound one. That is, where the language of the statutory
provision in question is ambiguous (here, the anti-retaliation provision does not announce
any particular adverse-action standard), the first interpretive aid should be the language
of other, closely-related statutory provisions, so that the pertinent provision can be read in
context. Here, the best and most obvious source in that regard is the core substantive
provision of Title VII, which, although not identical to the anti-retaliation provision,
bears striking resemblance to it.261 Both provisions make it an “unlawful employment
practice” for an employer to “discriminate against” certain individuals.262 The main
difference between the two is that the core substantive provision protects individuals
based on personal characteristics, while the anti-retaliation part protects individuals based
on their conduct.263 Aside from this obvious distinction, the two provisions operate
almost identically, except that the core substantive provision offers more description as to
the types of acts prohibited by it as discriminatory.264 Of course, this distinction was
critical to the Court, and led it to conclude that the scope of the provisions is vastly
different.265 But this conclusion is not compelled by the language of the statute, read in
context. Instead, it is equally plausible that Congress’s omission from the anti-retaliation
provision of the additional descriptors it included in its core substantive counterpart,
while perhaps intentional, is not reflective of such vast differences in intended meaning.
259
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Maybe Congress used the same terms, “unlawful employment practice” and
“discriminate against” in both provisions to connote that the scope should indeed be the
same, and simply intended the abbreviated language in the anti-retaliation provision to
serve as shorthand for its earlier, more descriptive language.266 Although such an
interpretation is likewise not compelled by either the language of the statute or its
context, alone, it is nevertheless plausible, and one that should not be discarded without
considering which interpretation best comports with other intrinsic and extrinsic aids to
interpretation – the statute’s legislative history, policy and purpose, and the
reasonableness of the proposed standard considering its practical application. I therefore
turn to those alternate sources now.
B.

The Policy Arguments: The Court’s Narrow View of the Statute’s
Purposes Leads it Astray.

The Court’s limited construction of the statutory language and context caused it to
reach abrupt conclusions about the appropriate scope and standard under the antiretaliation provision, but it was the Court’s constrained view of the statute’s purposes that
ultimately led it astray. After “presum[ing]” that Congress’s use of additional modifiers
with the term “discriminate against” in the core substantive provision signals an
intentional and stark difference in meaning between that provision and its anti-retaliation
counterpart, and in the absence of any legislative history directly on point,267 the Court
turned immediately to discussion of the statute’s purposes in an effort to justify its
conclusions.268 Here, the Court juxtaposed the purposes of the two provisions against
one another, recognizing the anti-discrimination provision’s aim to prevent
discrimination against individuals in the workplace based on their race, color, national
origin, religion, or gender, and the anti-retaliation provision’s goal of “preventing an
employer from interfering (through retaliation) with an employee’s efforts to secure or
advance enforcement of the Act’s basic guarantees.”269 The Court then concluded that, to
secure the substantive provision’s goals, Congress needed only prohibit employmentrelated discrimination.270 Securing the anti-retaliation provision’s goals, however, would
require more. That is, the Court determined that because “[a]n employer can effectively
retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his employment or
by causing him harm outside the workplace, . . . [a] provision limited to employmentrelated actions would not deter the many forms that effective retaliation can take.”271
Thus, the Court concluded, “such a limited construction would fail to fully achieve the
anti-retaliation provision’s ‘primary purpose,’ namely, ‘[m]aintaining unfettered access to
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statutory remedial mechanisms.’ ”272 Focusing its attention exclusively on
“main[tenance] [of] unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms” as the antiretaliation provision’s primary purpose,273 the Court held that “purpose reinforces what
language already indicates” – that the anti-retaliation provision encompasses nonworkplace harms and makes actionable any employer decision that might have dissuaded
a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s position from engaging in protected activity.274
The Court was not wrong to identify, and even emphasize, the maintenance of
“unfettered access to statutory remedial mechanisms” as an important purpose served by
the anti-retaliation provision. Indeed, that is surely one of the most important goals of
that part of Title VII. It is undeniable that society cannot eradicate discrimination in the
workplace – and therefore meet the central goal of the statute as a whole – without
sufficient protection for employees who believe prohibited discrimination is occurring.
The Court erred, however, in focusing so narrowly on what it perceived as the
only purpose of the anti-retaliation provision sufficiently significant to warrant
discussion. While no doubt important, such “unfettered access to statutory remedial
mechanisms” is surely not the only purpose of that provision. Attention to the Court’s
source of authority for that proposition verifies as much. In support of its assertion that
unfettered access is the statute’s primary purpose, the Court cited the only other Supreme
Court decision to identify specifically the policy behind Title VII’s anti-retaliation
provision. In Robinson v. Shell Oil Co., the Court likewise relied exclusively on that
same statutory purpose.275 There, the Court held that the term “employees” in Title VII’s
anti-retaliation provision includes not only current but also former employees.276 After
finding that term ambiguous on its face, the Court justified its conclusion based on “[t]he
broader context provided by other sections of the statute,” wherein former employees
may also make use of the statute’s remedial mechanisms, as well as what it perceived as
“a primary purpose” served by the statute: “Maintaining unfettered access to statutory
remedial mechanisms.”277 Notably, however, the Robinson Court did not employ
restrictive language in its formulation of the statute’s purpose. Instead, the Court simply
indicated that unfettered access to remedial mechanisms is “a primary purpose of anti[]retaliation provisions” generally, and cited to cases decided under the National Labor
Relations and Fair Labor Standards Acts as support.278
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Perhaps the Court’s singular focus on maintenance of unfettered access to the
statute’s remedies is justified in light of the dearth of pertinent legislative history.279
Indeed, the legislative history offers very little in the way of other potential purposes
served by the anti-retaliation provision, and the Supreme Court has never shed any
further light on the subject. Other plausible purposes likely exist, though, even if not
explicitly stated in the legislative history or expressly adopted by the Supreme Court. For
instance, one commentator has suggested that maintenance of the employer’s prerogative
to manage the workplace as it sees fit, not maintenance of access to the statute’s
remedies, is the only statutory purpose supported by the anti-retaliation provision’s
history.280 On this view, the employee protection afforded by the anti-retaliation
provision must yield to, or at least take account of, the employer’s right to control its
business and its human resources.281 If the Court had considered this policy rationale, its
ultimate outcome would likely have been different. Another plausible purpose served by
the anti-retaliation provision is protection of the informal conciliation process. Title VII
confers upon the EEOC the power to investigate any charge of discrimination made
against an employer or other covered entity.282 If, upon conducting such an investigation,
the EEOC determines “that there is reasonable cause to believe that the charge is true, the
Commission shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful employment practice
by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion.”283 This informal
conciliation process must take place before any formal litigation is filed.284 In order to
fulfill this duty, then, the EEOC must have access to all pertinent information, including
that obtainable from both the charging party and from other employees. As such, another
purpose underlying the anti-retaliation provision might well be promotion of the statute’s
conciliatory goals, as that process depends heavily upon the input of employees who in
turn may need the protection that provision affords. Again, consideration of such
possible alternative statutory purposes might have at least influenced, if not directly
impacted, the Court’s analysis.
The dearth of legislative history and of other worthy authorities offering insight as
to the statute’s purpose should not, however, narrow the focus when interpreting the
relevant provision, as it did in White. Instead, the absence of clear indicators pertinent
specifically to that provision should cause the Court to cast its net more widely, with
attention to the purposes underling the entire statute. Indeed, had the Court taken account
of other well-established goals served by Title VII more generally – i.e., had the Court
engaged a broader-scale inquiry of the statute’s purposes – it likely would have reached
somewhat different conclusions.
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At least three other policy goals served by Title VII deserved attention here. First
and foremost, Congress enacted Title VII to ensure equality of employment opportunities
among all individuals and to eliminate those discriminatory practices that have
disadvantaged people with certain personal characteristics in the workplace.285 Although
the Court recognized this goal in its discussion of the core substantive provision, it failed
to give it sufficient attention. The Court discussed this central goal of Title VII only
insofar as to juxtapose it against the narrower purposes served specifically by the antiretaliation provision.286 These differences in statutory purpose, said the Court, prove that
the provisions likewise differ in meaning – Congress intended one provision to eradicate
trait-based discrimination, while the other serves the wholly different goal of “assur[ing]
the cooperation upon which accomplishment of the Act’s primary objective depends.”287
To treat these purposes as wholly separate, however, is not consistent with construction
of the statute as a whole.288 Rather, the two provisions of the statute must be read
together to promote not just the purposes served by each individual provision but also by
the entire statute.289 The Court’s conclusion that because the two provisions serve
different purposes, they must have different meanings, fails to take sufficient account of
the primary goal of the statute as a whole. Congress aimed, first and foremost, to
eradicate discrimination on the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, and gender, when it
enacted Title VII.290 The anti-retaliation provision, while also serving its own function,
should primarily promote this central goal.291 The Court’s holding in White, however,
accords broader scope and meaning to the anti-retaliation provision than to the statute’s
core provision.292 This, in turn, results in a broader standard under the anti-retaliation
provision that elevates the status of individuals covered by it above those the statute aims
first and foremost to protect.
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A simple hypothetical with two variations illustrates this principle. Suppose an
industrial company that assigns one employee to operate a piece of heavy machinery
(e.g., a bulldozer) as his or her primary duty. Operating this bulldozer requires that he or
she possess special skills. Suppose further that, in response to complaints from other
employees with greater seniority who likewise possess the special skills required to
operate the bulldozer, the employer decides to re-assign the bulldozer operator to perform
other tasks so that the bulldozer-operation duties can be distributed more broadly. The
new duties assigned to the former bulldozer operator fall within the broad parameters of
the employee’s basic job description. Nevertheless, the employee is understandably
disgruntled – he/she much prefers the cleaner, and at least perceptibly more prestigious,
bulldozer operation duties. Now suppose further that in one scenario, this disgruntled
employee is an African-American female. In a variant on the same hypothetical, the
disgruntled employee is a white male who complained to management just a few weeks
earlier that female employees were harassing him based on his sex. Under these
circumstances, the African-American female may be unable to make out a prima facie
case of race or sex discrimination because, perhaps among other things, the employer’s
act of changing her duties within her pre-existing job description would likely not be
considered sufficiently adverse.293 Such a change in duties within the parameters of the
employee’s pre-existing job description simply does not effect an “extreme . . .change in
the terms and conditions of [her] employment” as the Court requires.294 Thus, any claim
she might bring is subject to dismissal at summary judgment, if not before. By contrast,
however, the white male who recently complained of harassment is now far more likely
to survive past the summary judgment stage, and get his retaliation claim before a jury.
The Court’s holding in White provides direct support for his claim.295 He is therefore
much more likely to receive a favorable settlement from the employer, even without
having to expend the time, energy and money required to pursue litigation. This
hypothetical may over-simplify the matter, but it nevertheless illustrates that the Court’s
imposition of a broader adverse-action standard under the anti-retaliation clause than
under the core substantive provision elevates the status of those who engage in protected
activity above those the statute was originally designed to protect.
Indeed, this hypothetical demonstrates that the Court’s standard might even lead
to perverse results by creating an incentive for employees to bring meritless claims in
order to obtain protection from routine job actions. For example, in a further variant on
the hypothetical, if two employees both apply for open bulldozer-operator job, but one
has recently filed a complaint and therefore become protected under the anti-retaliation
293

See, e.g., James v. Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc., 368 F.3d 371, 376 (4th Cir. 2004) (“ ‘[A]bsent
any decrease in compensation, job title, level of responsibility, or opportunity for promotion, reassignment
to a new position commensurate with one’s salary level does not constitute an adverse employment action
even if the new job causes some modest stress not present in the old position.”); Brown v. Brody, 199 F.3d
446, 456 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (affirming summary judgment to employer because employee failed to show
adverse employment action sufficient to support race discrimination claim based on job transfer absent
circumstances showing demotion or other “clear showing of adversity”).
294
See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 788 (1998) (“We have made it clear that
conduct must be extreme to amount to a change in the terms and conditions of employment . . . .”).
295
See White, 126 S. Ct. at 2417 (holding that reassignment to dirtier and more arduous job duties
from position of some prestige supports actionable retaliation).

43

provision, he is more likely to get that job, regardless of merit, seniority, or any other
more relevant factors. As such, the Court’s standard not only elevates the status of
whistleblowers above the minorities whom the statute was intended to protect, but it also
creates classes among employees, divided along lines of those who have engaged in
protected activity and those who have not, to the direct detriment of workplace equity.
The Court addressed this concern only briefly, in response to similar arguments
offered by both Burlington and the United States government as amicus curiae in their
briefs to the Court.296 The Court’s response, however, is limited to the assertion that
Congress likewise provided protection from retaliation in other contexts “without any
judicial suggestion that those provisions are limited to the conduct prohibited by the
primary substantive provisions” of the respective statutes.297 The Court cited to the
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”), and cases decided thereunder, as support, but
the citations the Court provided do not reflect any affirmative determination that the antiretaliation provision of the NLRA is indeed broader in scope than its substantive
counterpart, or that such a conclusion is required in any other context, under Title VII or
otherwise. The Court’s citations indicate at most that the NLRA’s anti-retaliation
provision might be broader in scope, not that in fact it is.298 The Court therefore offered
essentially no substantive response to the well-founded argument that applying a broader
standard under the anti-retaliation provision needlessly elevates the status of
whistleblowers above historically mistreated and down-trodden groups. As a result, the
Court’s analysis failed to take sufficient account of the primary purpose underlying Title
VII as a whole – the eradication of workplace discrimination against minority
individuals.
The Court’s standard also contravenes Title VII policy by discouraging
forethought by employers and interfering unnecessarily with management
prerogatives.299 The Court has repeatedly touted the importance of the latter of these
policies, emphasizing that Title VII does not require an employer to give preferential
treatment to any of the individuals it protects or to “restructure its employment practices
to maximize the number of [protected-class individuals] hired.”300 The former of these
policies is also important, and is most evident in cases like Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth, where the Court held that an employer sued for sexual harassment by a
supervisor may mount an affirmative defense comprised of two parts: “(a) that the
296

Id. at 2414.
Id.
298
See Bill Johnson’s Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 740 (1983) (discussing breadth of
anti-retaliation provisions of National Labor Relations Act but without reference or comparison to Act’s
substantive provision); NLRB v. Scrivener, 405 U.S. 117, 121-22 (1972) (discussing purpose of NLRA’s
anti-retaliation provision).
299
See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998) (referencing encouragement of
employer forethought as one of Title VII’s “basic policies”).
300
Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 259 (1981); see also United
Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206 (1979) (gleaning from legislative history of Title VII that
Congress did not intend to “diminish traditional management prerogatives”); see also Price Waterhouse v.
Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 242 (1989) (“The other important aspect of the statute is its preservation of an
employer’s remaining freedom of choice. . . . The statute’s maintenance of employer prerogatives is
evident from the statute itself and from its history, both in Congress and in this Court.”).
297

44

employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take
advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to
avoid harm otherwise.”301 This decision provided a strong incentive for employers to
ensure that they had in place thorough and well-publicized policies prohibiting any form
of harassment in the workplace, to provide open lines of communication between
employees and management about alleged harassment, to implement training programs at
all employment levels to raise awareness of what constitutes harassment, and to impose
stiff penalties as evidence of the employer’s unwillingness to tolerate it.
The Court’s decision in White, however, does not promote any such positive
response because the standard it imposes is unworkably vague. The Court describes its
standard as an objective one. Indeed, the Court devotes an entire paragraph to explaining
the need for objectivity under these circumstances:
We refer to reactions of a reasonable employee because we believe that
the provision’s standard for judging harm must be objective. An objective
standard is judicially administrable. It avoids the uncertainties and unfair
discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s
unusual subjective feelings. We have emphasized the need for objective
standards in other Title VII contexts, and those same concerns animate our
decision here.302
The very next paragraph, however, changes the landscape drastically, injecting
substantial subjectivity into the inquiry that the Court works so hard to tout as wholly
objective.303 Specifically, the Court qualifies the “objective” adverse-action standard by
requiring that courts take account of the plaintiff’s unique circumstances. The Court
explained:
We phrase the standard in general terms because the significance of any
given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular
circumstances. Context matters. ‘The real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a simple
recitation of the words used or the physical acts performed.304
The first of the two examples the Court then offers makes abundantly clear the subjective
nature of its test: “A schedule change in an employee’s work schedule may make little
difference to many workers, but may matter enormously to a young mother with school
age children.”305 Thus, a schedule change that might not “dissuade[] a reasonable worker
301

Id. at 765.
White, 126 S. Ct. at 2415 (emphasis in original) (citing Pennsylvania State Police v. Suders, 542
U.S. 129, 141 (2004) (constructive discharge doctrine) and Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21
(1993) (hostile work environment doctrine)).
303
Id.
304
Id.
305
Id.
302

45

from making or supporting a charge of discrimination” and therefore is not “materially
adverse” under the objective side of the Court’s standard306 might nevertheless be
actionable if the affected employee happens to have young children at home. But how is
an employer contemplating such a schedule change to know whether the affected
employee indeed has young children at home?
The subjective side of the Court’s standard therefore leaves an employer
considering any change that might affect an employee who has recently engaged in
protected activity with two choices: it can interview the employee extensively in an
attempt to ascertain whether the contemplated change might somehow affect her more
substantially than an otherwise “reasonable worker” (the riskier approach), or it can
refrain from taking any action affecting her at all, regardless of its needs (the safer but
otherwise less desirable approach). The first option may encourage forethought by
employers – indeed, it does so to an extreme – but only to the detriment of traditional
management prerogatives, as employers will be forced to treat employees protected under
the anti-retaliation provision with kid gloves and thereby lose the ability to make and
implement decisions affecting such employees without exposure to substantial Title VII
liability. The second option, however, is in many respects worse, as it deprives the
employer entirely of the ability to manage its human resources in the way it deems most
effective. Moreover, the subjectivity of the standard casts such ambiguity on whether a
given employer action will support a retaliation claim that an employer has almost no
incentive to devote substantial forethought to its course of action because it is almost
impossible to predict accurately how an employee’s unique circumstances will bear upon
any change he might face. The educated employer will know that the best way to avoid
risk is to do nothing at all, rather than to undertake a more extensive and thoughtful
review of the situation.
Consider, for example, a relatively typical scenario in which this concern might
arise. Suppose that Employee A, a female, has complained of sexual harassment by
Employee B, her male supervisor. Cognizant of its duties under Ellerth, the employer
responded quickly to Employee A’s complaints and conducted a thorough investigation
of her allegations, which led the employer to conclude that some unlawful harassment
had indeed taken place. Thus, the employer determined that not only should Employee B
suffer an unpaid suspension, but also Employee A should no longer have to report to or
work with Employee B after he returns (presuming the offense was not so grave as to
warrant immediate discharge). The organizational structure of the company, however, is
such that it could easily transfer Employee A to a different, comparable position with the
same pay and benefits, but would encounter substantial organizational difficulty (and thus
expense) not only finding an alternative position for Employee B but also replacing him
as a supervisor in Employee A’s department. After White, an employer is well advised to
transfer Employee B notwithstanding the extraordinary difficulties it may then encounter,
rather than Employee A, because it will incur a substantial risk of Title VII liability by
taking any action affecting Employee A, especially without detailed knowledge of any
unique circumstances that might make her more susceptible to negative impact. While it
is true that Employee A should not be made to suffer any negative consequences from
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these circumstances, of which she was victim and not perpetrator, Title VII was not
intended to require employers to treat the individuals protected by it more favorably than
others.307 But the risk-averse employer faced with this conundrum will likely do just that,
and will accord special treatment to Employee A in order to reduce the prospect of costly
and time-consuming litigation. Indeed, the risk-averse employer will likely not only do
what it takes to remove Employee B from Employee A’s work environment, rather than
the converse, but will likely choose not to take any action that might affect Employee A
in any respect for at least several months and maybe more, until the time period of
presumptive causation has passed.
The approach adopted by the Court in White takes adequate account of one of the
central purposes of Title VII’s anti-retaliation provision but fails to accord sufficient
consideration to other, equally important policies underlying the statute as a whole.
While prohibiting employer conduct aimed at stifling employee participation in the
enforcement process is critical, it is improper to do so to such an extent that hampers
other statutory goals. Title VII aims chiefly to eradicate discrimination in the workplace,
and any interpretation of it should bear that goal in mind first and foremost. The standard
adopted by the Court in White not only detracts from this worthy goal by elevating the
status of whistleblowers above those the statute was originally enacted to protect, but also
interferes substantially and unnecessarily with management prerogatives and even
discourages the employer forethought that the statute seeks to promote. For these reasons
and in light of other practical considerations discussed below, the Court’s interpretation
simply does not work.
C.

An Unworkable Standard in the Real World: The Impracticalities of the
Court’s Approach.

Not only does the Court’s decision in White fail to take adequate account of
relevant policy considerations, but it also implements a standard that is unworkably
vague in at least three respects. The first is readily apparent on review of the Court’s own
illustration of its standard. As discussed above,308 the Court’s standard, although initially
touted as objective, includes highly subjective components.309 The Court explained that
“any given act of retaliation will often depend upon the particular circumstances,” and
offered as an example the single mother with young children who suffers a far greater
burden by a schedule change to the night shift than many other workers without childcare
needs would experience.310 No doubt this is true. But by offering this example, the
Court suggests that an employer must ascertain substantial personal information about an
employee who has engaged in protected activity before making any changes that affect
her job, as the alternative is having to defend any subsequent lawsuit solely on the
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grounds that the decision was made for a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, and
severely limiting its opportunities to defend successfully a non-retaliatory decision at or
prior to the summary judgment stage. As such, the Court opens wide a large can of
worms. How extensively must the employer search to determine how a proposed
decision might affect a protected worker? What characteristics should count? The
standard is nominally objective – whether a reasonable employee in the plaintiff’s
position would find the employer’s action materially adverse – but apparently requires an
employer to engage in a fact-finding mission of some unspecified scope. Moreover,
because the inquiry advised by the Court is so fact-specific, an employer striving to “do
the right thing” may be thwarted from doing so simply for lack of guidance as to what
questions it should ask, and which of the employee’s myriad unique circumstances it
should take into account. The Court’s subjective standard also implicates concerns about
employee privacy. If an employer is required to dig deeply into an employee’s personal
life in order to ascertain how a proposed employment action might affect him, his
personal life becomes the employer’s business, and he might resist the process. In any
event, he must choose between disclosing the requested information or possibly suffering
what he perceives to be an adverse job action. Most employers attempting to avoid
liability will surely find this process extremely unwieldy, if not impossible. As such, the
subjectivity of the Court’s standard makes its implementation almost wholly unworkable
in the real world.
The Court’s standard also suffers from ambiguity in the form of what Justice
Alito refers to as “a loose and unfamiliar causation standard.”311 This ambiguity arises
when the Court attempts to explain what it means by the “material adversity” standard it
imposes: “[A] plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would have found the
challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well might have
dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination.’
”312 As with the Court’s working-mother example, discussed above, this assertion raises
a multitude of questions. How does one (i.e., an employer attempting compliance or a
court adjudicating a claim) assess whether an action “well might have dissuaded”
protected activity? Is this somehow different from an action that, for example, “would
have dissuaded” that same reasonable worker from lodging a complaint? What purpose
does the modifier term “well” serve? In other words, does the standard “well might have
dissuaded” protected activity differ from a standard that only encompasses actions that
simply “might have dissuaded” protected activity? If so, how? The Court does not
answer any of these questions; nor does the Court provide any indication as to how an
employer attempting compliance, an aggrieved employee contemplating legal action, or
court adjudicating a claim should answer them. Instead, the Court leaves these questions
open, to be decided by the lower courts, beginning the process once again of defining the
adverse-action standard under the anti-retaliation provision.
Third, the deterrence-based aspects of the standard make it both unworkably
vague and detrimentally subjective in that it may require courts and/or juries to assess the
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alleged adverse act relative to the severity of the discrimination alleged in each case.
Justice Alito raised this point in his concurring opinion:
[T]he majority’s interpretation logically implies that the degree of
protection afforded to a victim of retaliation is inversely proportional to
the severity of the original act of discrimination that prompted the
retaliation. A reasonable employee who is subjected to the most severe
discrimination will not easily be dissuaded from filing a charge by the
threat of retaliation; the costs of filing the charge, including possible
retaliation, will have to be great to outweigh the benefits, such as
preventing the continuation of the discrimination in the future and
obtaining damages and other relief for past discrimination. Because the
possibility of relatively severe retaliation will not easily dissuade this
employee, the employer will be able to engage in relatively severe
retaliation without incurring liability under § 704(a). On the other hand,
an employee who is subjected to a much milder form of discrimination
will be much more easily dissuaded. For this employee, the costs of
complaining, including possible retaliation, will not have to be great to
outweigh the lesser benefits that might be obtained by filing a charge.313
The majority responded directly to this criticism, stating simply that “contrary to the
claim of the concurrence, this standard does not require a reviewing court or jury to
consider ‘the nature of the discrimination that led to the filing of the charge.’ . . . Rather,
the standard is tied to the challenged retaliatory act, not the underlying conduct that forms
the basis of the Title VII complaint.”314 But the majority’s response does not answer the
problem. A hypothetical may aid illustration. Suppose that Employee A, an AfricanAmerican female, suffers a series of adverse employment acts, including a 50% pay
decrease along with a demotion from a high-level management position to a nonsupervisory laborer position. Employee B, a Muslim, is denied the reasonable
accommodation of an hour off work at noontime on two or three separate Fridays so that
he may attend religious ceremonies.315 Suppose further that if either employee complains
about the discrimination suffered, the employer will deprive him or her of two days’ paid
vacation time to which he or she is otherwise entitled. A reasonable employee in B’s
position might be dissuaded from complaining about the alleged discrimination, for fear
of losing two full days worth of paid vacation, thus making the employer’s deprivation of
a paid-vacation benefit “material” under the majority’s standard in that case. A
reasonable employee in A’s position, however, probably would not be deterred from
complaining about the severe discrimination she has suffered, even if she might also lose
two days’ paid vacation. This cost is not so high as to deter her from complaining about
the substantial losses she has already sustained and from seeking relief from them. As
such, the employer’s act of denying paid vacation might well be unlawful, actionable
retaliation in B’s case, but at the same time fail to support a retaliation claim at all in A’s.
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The Court’s reliance upon deterrence in defining what actions are sufficiently “material”
to support a retaliation claim therefore requires the court and/or the jury in some, if not
all cases, to assess the underlying discriminatory act relative to the alleged retaliation,
thereby injecting substantial vagaries and greater unpredictability into the inquiry.
These considerations of reasonableness and practicality should probably take a
back seat to the other statutory interpretation tools discussed above – the language of the
statute itself,316 and the policies and purposes behind it.317 Nevertheless, “[i]t is a ‘wellestablished principle of statutory interpretation that the law favors rational and sensible
construction.’ ”318 The interpretation offered by the Court, while not entirely irrational
on its face, leads to impractical and irrational results. It ties the hands of employers
unnecessarily tight, and imposes a vague and subjective standard that will leave
employers, employees, and courts alike guessing as to which employer actions are
sufficiently adverse to be actionable. The interpretation adopted by the Court in White is
not compelled by the statutory language and context, is inconsistent with the statute’s
broader policies and purposes, and is unworkably vague and impractical in the real world.
VI.

IN SEARCH OF A CURE: THE NEED FOR CONGRESSIONAL
INTERVENTION TO FIX THE PROBLEMS WHITE CREATES.

While the Court could feasibly fix the overbreadth, vagueness and impracticality
problems created by its decision in White, it is not likely to do so. First, eight of the
Court’s nine justices joined in the majority opinion, making that sort of sea change in the
Court’s direction unlikely to occur any time in the near future. Second, the stare decisis
effect of a decision interpreting a statute is especially strong, making a contrary decision
all the more improbable.319 Thus, the most plausible fix to the problems White creates
requires Congress to step in. With just a few minor revisions to the statute, Congress
could easily implement a clearer, more workable standard that better comports with the
purposes and policies supporting Title VII as a whole.
A.

A Proposal for Congressional Action: Minor Revisions to Bring About
Greater Clarity.

Congress should revise the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII to make clear
that its scope is identical to that of the statute’s core substantive provision and that the
relevant adverse-action standard under both provisions is therefore the same. To effect
316
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such a change would not require substantial rewriting. Congress need only add a few key
words to the anti-retaliation provision to make clear that its scope is intended to mirror
that of its core substantive counterpart. I propose that Congress revise section 704 of
Title VII by adding the underlined language as follows:
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to fail or
refuse to hire, to discharge, or otherwise to discriminate against any of his
employees or applicants for employment with respect to any such
individual’s compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment, for an employment agency or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,
including on-the-job training programs, to so discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to so discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed any
practice, made an unlawful employment practice by this title, or because
he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in
an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this title.
The insertion of these few additional terms should reverse the Court’s decision in White
in two important ways: (1) by making clear that the scope of the anti-retaliation
provision is identical to the scope of the core substantive provision so that both sections
apply only to those employer actions that impact the terms, conditions, or privileges of
the employee’s employment; and (2) by indicating that, because the provisions employ
the same language, the Court’s interpretations of the core substantive provision should
inform interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision, and vice versa. Revision of the
anti-retaliation provision in this manner, especially if accomplished soon, would not
cause any drastic change in the law, as it would bring the scope and standard under the
anti-retaliation provision in line with that in place in the majority of jurisdictions before
the Court decided White.320 Moreover, such revision would come closer to the clarity
needed in an otherwise vague area of the law, would promote achievement of the
statute’s primary goals, and would comport with standards of reasonableness that the
practicalities of the real world demand.
B.

Why Bigger Isn’t Always Better : An Explanation of the Proposed
Statutory Revision.

The revision I propose narrows the scope of the anti-retaliation provision but
improves its enforceability and effectiveness in the process, thereby demonstrating that
bigger – or a broader scope or standard, as the case may be – is not always better.
Indeed, the revised standard departs little from the approach followed in most
jurisdictions before White, and changes the outcome under White as to only a small
subset of adverse actions that an employer might take. Envisioning the range of actions
an employer might take against an employee along a spectrum from what the Court might
320
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term “petty slights” or “minor annoyances,”321 on one end, to “ultimate” employment
decisions322 like failure to hire and discharge, on the other end, facilitates explanation of
this concept. Employer decisions that lie at either end of this spectrum receive the same
treatment under the Court’s standard in White and under the revised standard I propose,
so that my revision has no effect on decisions of either sort. “Petty slights” and “minor
annoyances” are too insignificant to warrant statutory remedy or judicial involvement and
therefore fall outside the scope of actionable conduct under either standard, while
“ultimate” employment decisions have such a profound effect on employment that both
formulations readily encompass them. It is the vast grey area in between these two poles
that needs definition, and the standard I propose better provides that definition than the
highly subjective approach approved by the Court in White.
Job transfers, duty reassignments, negative performance evaluations, and poor
treatment by co-workers or supervisors occupy much of this expanse between the poles
anchored by “petty slights” and “ultimate” employment decisions, respectively. It is
employment actions such as these – that that have some impact on an employee’s job but
are not so clearly either minor or substantial that their actionability is beyond doubt – that
cause the most uncertainty, both for well-meaning employers attempting to manage the
workplace and for courts adjudicating claims. Thus, it is within this grey area that
definition is most needed. The standard offered by the Court in White, however, fails to
provide the necessary level of clarity. As discussed above, the Court implements a
standard that purports to be objective but also injects substantial subjectivity into the
adversity inquiry.323 That is, “a plaintiff must show that a reasonable employee would
have found the challenged action materially adverse, ‘which in this context means it well
might have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of
discrimination.’ ”324 This standard, as discussed above, is facially unclear insofar as the
Court provides no indication what its “well-might-dissuade” standard means.325 The lack
of clarity is magnified, however, when the Court goes on to instruct that a court should
not only ensure that the conduct complained of would be “materially adverse” to a
reasonable employee, but that it would be so to one in the plaintiff’s specific position.326
The Court’s first example here makes evident that this subjective inquiry is wholly
dependent of the objective one, as the Court suggests that a schedule change that makes
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“little difference to many workers” – i.e. would not be materially adverse to a reasonable
worker – “may matter enormously to a young mother with school age children.”327
The revised standard I propose offers greater clarity than the Court’s vague “wellmight-dissuade” formulation with a highly subjective component, in that it limits
actionable conduct to that which affects the terms, conditions, or privileges of the
plaintiff’s employment and thereby mirrors the statute’s core substantive provision. As
such, the same adverse-action standard would apply under the revised anti-retaliation
provision as currently applies under the core substantive provision, so that only those
employer actions that rise to a threshold level of materiality could support a claim.
The Supreme Court has not clearly defined the adverse-action element of a Title
VII claim but has instructed as to its scope on numerous occasions. As discussed in more
detail above,328 the Court has repeatedly held that the core substantive provision’s
reference to the “compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” does not
limit actionable conduct to that which affects the employee’s “ ‘terms’ and ‘conditions’
in the narrow contractual sense” but rather is much broader, encompassing even some
harms without any tangible or economic consequence.329 The Court has made clear,
though, that there are limits to this expansive approach. That is, not every intangible and
non-economic harm is actionable. Instead, for an intangible or non-economic harm to
support a claim, it must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive ‘to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment.’ ”330 Thus, under the revised anti-retaliation provision I propose,
those employer actions that directly impact an employee’s compensation, or the terms,
conditions, or privileges of his employment – i.e. those that result in tangible or economic
harms – will support a claim. Also actionable are those employer decisions resulting in
intangible or non-economic harms, so long as they are sufficiently severe or pervasive to
alter the conditions of the plaintiff’s employment.
Admittedly, this is still not a black and white test. Key terms like “tangible,”
“severe,” and “pervasive” remain relatively undefined and provide room for
disagreement and debate. Even the somewhat clearer term “economic” leaves some
room for doubt as to whether, for example, the economic effect must be direct or
immediate. Indeed, the Court is correct that “ ‘[t]he real social impact of workplace
behavior often depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations,
and relationships which are not fully captured by a single recitation of the words used or
the physical acts performed.’ ”331 As such, it would be impossible to formulate a
standard that provides a clear answer in every case. The revised standard, though, would
allow both courts and compliance-ready employers to draw upon the developing body of
327
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case law interpreting Title VII’s core substantive provision to assist in answering
questions about the scope of actionable retaliation. Meritor Savings Bank and its progeny
begin to lay this framework. Ellerth could help here, too, as the Court might become
more comfortable importing its definition of “tangible employment action” so that the
same definition applies in this context, too.
Moreover, other cases further define the parameters. For instance, the Court
made clear in Oncale that Title VII does not set forth “a general civility code” and “does
not reach genuine but innocuous differences in the ways men and women routinely
interact with members of the same sex and of the opposite sex.”332 The Harris Court
likewise emphasized that Title VII has strict outer limits: “Conduct that is not severe or
pervasive enough to create an objectively hostile or abusive work environment--an
environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive--is beyond Title VII's
purview.”333 The Court further elaborated in Faragher v. City of Boca Raton that
“simple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious) will
not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and conditions of employment.’ ”334
The Court’s decision in White is not entirely inconsistent with these precedents.
Indeed, in support of its “material adversity” standard, the White Court cited both Oncale
and Faragher for the proposition that Title VII does not afford a remedy for “trivial
harms” and explained that “petty slights” and “annoyances” are not encompassed by Title
VII’s core substantive provision. 335 In this respect, the revised standard I propose would
not depart substantially from the standard announced by the Court in White. Instead, just
as suggested by the Court, the revised provision would incorporate these same limitations
into the anti-retaliation provision that have developed under the statute’s core substantive
provision, so that the standards would be the same. Both would require what the Court
terms “material adversity.”336
My proposed revision would, however, improve upon the Court’s standard in that
it would clear up the most substantial source of confusion in White – its imposition of a
subjective component that operates as an alternative, not just a supplement, to the
objective one. As discussed above, the Court announces a nominally objective standard,
but substantially clouds the picture by offering an example that requires a wholly
subjective inquiry.337 The revised provision would fix this problem by incorporating
Harris’s more workable objective-plus-subjective test without sacrificing either
component. In Harris, the Court held that a Title VII plaintiff could prevail only upon
showing not only that her work environment is objectively hostile or abusive but also that
it is subjectively perceived by her as such.338 This hybrid approach offers substantially
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greater clarity than the objective-or-subjective alternative approach at least implicitly
endorsed by the Court in White. Where the statute prohibits only those employer
decisions that meet a threshold level of objectively-viewed materiality, a well-intentioned
employer can more readily assess whether a proposed course of action will run afoul of
statutory requirements. Likewise, such a standard better meets the White Court’s stated
goal of being “judicially administrable” in that it “avoids the uncertainties and unfair
discrepancies that can plague a judicial effort to determine a plaintiff’s unusual subjective
feelings.”339
My proposed revision would not only clear up the confusion created by the
Court’s subjective adverse-action standard but would also reverse the Court’s overlyexpansive reading of the statutory language to encompass non-workplace harms. The
Court’s holding on this point in effect converts Title VII into a catchall tort statute,
protecting an employee who has engaged in protected activity from any adverse treatment
whatsoever, whether employment-related or not. For example, the Court’s decision could
afford a Title VII claim to a restaurant employee who has engaged in protected activity
and is subsequently served rotten food while dining there during non-working hours.
Title VII is an employment statute and should not reach so far. To do so will only dilute
its effectiveness in its intended sphere.
Moreover, the revised anti-retaliation provision would accomplish much of what
the Court apparently intended. The Court cited two cases in support of its conclusion that
because “[a]n employer can effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions
not directly related to his employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace,”
the anti-retaliation provision should encompass non-workplace harms. In one of those
cases, the D. C. Circuit upheld a Title VII retaliation claim by an FBI agent who alleged
that his employer failed to provide off-duty security in the face of death threats.340 In the
other, the Tenth Circuit permitted recovery against a car dealership that filed false
criminal charges against a former employee who had complained of discrimination.341
The former of these cases readily illustrates that it was not necessary for the Court to
expand the reach of the statute so far in order to satisfy its concerns, as off-duty security
is surely at least a “privilege,” if not a “condition,” of an FBI agent’s employment.342
The same could be said of the Tenth Circuit case, as well, where the charges filed against
the former employee alleged that he had stolen from the employer during his
employment, thus connecting his claim directly to his employment and obviating the
need for a more expansive remedy. Thus, adding to the anti-retaliation provision the
qualifying language that appears in the core counterpart would accomplish much the
same result as desired by the Court, but without expanding the statute’s reach too far.
subjectively offensive, one that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one that the victim
in fact did perceive to be so.”).
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C.

Maintaining Access While Equalizing Treatment: Policy Justifications for
the Proposed Statutory Revision.

The statutory revision I propose would not only make the anti-retaliation
provision more readily enforceable, and therefore more effective, but it would also better
comport with Title VII’s policies and purposes. First, the revision would not detract from
the statutory purpose the White Court relied upon as primary – the maintenance of
unfettered access to the statute’s remedial mechanisms. The Court accords sufficiently
broad protection under the statute’s core substantive provision that a consistent
interpretation of the anti-retaliation provision would amply promote this goal. The core
substantive provision does not limit actionable misconduct to “economic” or “tangible”
discrimination or to that which affects the “terms” and “conditions” of employment “in
the narrow contractual sense.”343 Instead, it reaches much farther, encompassing any
employer act that exposes a protected employee to “disadvantageous terms or conditions
of employment to which [employees outside the protected class] are not exposed.”344
Granted, such conduct must be “extreme to amount to a change in the terms and
conditions of employment,” as Title VII is not intended to operate as a “general civility
code” and therefore does not reach petty slights, minor annoyances, simple teasing,
offhand comments and other such insufficiently adverse treatment.345 But the Court has
repeatedly upheld these limitations on what actions may support a claim of discrimination
against an employee based on his or her protected trait (race, sex, religion, etc.). Surely,
then, what is not sufficiently wrong to afford an employee a remedy for discrimination
based on his protected trait, is likewise insufficiently wrong to support a claim of
discrimination based on his protected conduct.
The Court in White disagrees, and suggests that because “[a]n employer can
effectively retaliate against an employee by taking actions not directly related to his
employment or by causing him harm outside the workplace,” the scope of the antiretaliation provision must be broader.346 But the examples the Court provides here,
which are discussed above,347 fail to demonstrate that the anti-retaliation provision’s
goals cannot be met by affording employees the same protection under it as under the
statute’s core counterpart. Were the statute revised as I suggest, the employee-plaintiffs
in both cases cited by the Court would remain protected.348 Moreover, White would
remain protected too, at least as to her suspension, which deprived her of income for an
extended period of time thereby having an objective, material adverse effect on her
compensation. The slightly narrower protection I propose would still deter the vast
majority of retaliation against protected employees, but would not expand Title VII
beyond the employment-centered bounds upon which it was enacted.
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Moreover, the proposed revision would better promote Title VII’s other statutory
goals. First and foremost among these, as discussed above, is the assurance of equality in
the workplace.349 Equating the protection afforded to employees who engage in
protected activity with that afforded to the minorities the statute exists to protect certainly
does not hinder this central legislative policy. Indeed, as the examples discussed above
demonstrate, affording broader protection under the anti-retaliation provision than its
substantive counterpart actually contravenes this goal by causing employers to treat
employees who engage in protected activity more favorably than any others, including
those who would otherwise benefit from the statute’s core provision.350 Thus, revising
the statute as I propose would cure this problem by equalizing the protection afforded
individuals in each of these groups.
My revision would also encourage employer forethought and promote
maintenance of management prerogatives. For instance, because case law interpreting
the core provision would apply equally to the anti-retaliation provision, employers would
be incentivized by the Court’s holdings in Ellerth and Faragher to implement and
publicize policies strictly prohibiting retaliation. The revision would also encourage an
employer to consider carefully any potentially-adverse action it might take against an
employee who has engaged in protected activity, as the standard’s objective threshold
would permit a well-intentioned employer to assess more accurately whether its proposed
action would be unlawful or not. Further, employers would be freer to make decisions
about how to run the workplace within the confines of the law because their hands would
not be tied by an overbroad, vague, and highly subjective standard. The courts charged
with the statute’s judicial administration would also benefit similarly from this clearer,
more objective standard. In addition, any docket congestion that might result from
potentially substantial collateral litigation over personal traits as part of the courts’
administration of White’s “subjective” standard would be avoided. The greater clarity
and objective threshold offered by the core provision’s standard would prevail, benefiting
employers, employees and courts, alike.
D.

A Standard We Can All Live With: Practical Justifications for the
Proposed Statutory Revision.

Finally, the proposed revision makes sense practically speaking. The subjective
standard imposed by the Court in White leaves employers guessing about how to treat
employees who engage in protected activity, requiring employers to engage in extensive
factfinding of some unspecified scope before making any management decision that
might somehow impact any protected employee.351 Its vagaries, reflected in the Court’s
mysterious “well might dissuade” causation standard, cast further shadows on the already
wavering line between prohibited and permissible conduct.352 The revised standard,
however, avoids these pitfalls. It implements the clearer objective-plus-subjective
349
350
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inquiry espoused by the Court in cases like Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,353 and avoids
entirely the vague causation standard implemented in White. The statutory revision I
propose therefore offers greater clarity to employers and courts, while continuing to
protect employees who engage in protected activity to the extent they deserve.
VII.

CONCLUSION.

The strict enforcement of Title VII necessary to maintenance of equality in the
workplace depends heavily upon complaints by and information from employees, who
come closer than most anyone else to witnessing employer conduct first hand. These
employees, in turn, cannot effectively aid the enforcement process without sufficient
protection from employer retaliation. The anti-retaliation provision offers this protection,
but because its language is not specific as to its intended scope, courts have struggled to
define clear standards of conduct by which employers could then readily abide. The
Supreme Court had the opportunity to offer some much-needed clarity when it decided
Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White in June 2006, but its efforts fell
short of the task. The standard announced by the Court in that case, while nominally
objective, injects substantial subjectivity into the adverse-action inquiry. Moreover, the
Court’s discussion of its standard raises more questions than it answers, leaving wellintentioned employers, potentially aggrieved employees, and courts, alike, without the
direction they need to uphold the important goals Title VII seeks to accomplish. The
problems the White decision creates are not without remedy, though. Congress could
step in to cure these problems by amending the anti-retaliation provision to make clear
that the same standards govern there as under the statute’s core anti-discrimination
provision. While such a revision might not resolve every ambiguity, as open questions
remain under the core provision’s standard, as well, it would nevertheless bring to the
table substantially greater clarity than the Court’s vague and subjective standard in
White. Only time will tell just how difficult the Court’s standard will be to administer,
but the continued enhancement of the Title VII enforcement process is too important to
wait. Congress should step in now, and provide the executors of Title VII’s equalitybased will – employers and courts – with the direction they need in order to better fulfill
their duties.
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